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Abstract
I have explained business cycles in Canada focusing on the role of money.
To do that, I have used both empirical and theoretical models. The empirical
investigations include performing causality tests and computing impulse re-
sponses based on structural and co-integrated vector autoregressive models.
The theoretical models consist of RBC and new-Keynesian models. Some of
these theoretical models are: the inflation tax, the inflation and tax code,
the sticky price, and the financial accelerator models.
The empirical models indicate monetary disturbances are instrumental in
business cycle fluctuations but do not necessarily cause them. The theoretical
models also point out that monetary disturbances contribute to business
cycle fluctuations but not as much as technological change. Some channels
through witch they propagate are: nominal capital gain tax, price stickiness,
and deteriorating financial conditions. Price stickiness turns out to play the
major role.
Keywords: Business Cycles, Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, Sticky
Prices, Vector Autoregression, Vector Error Correction.
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Non-Technical Summary
Objectives The purpose of this research is to document business cycle facts in
Canada and explain them emphasizing on the role of money. The issues addressed
are: Do monetary disturbances cause aggregate fluctuations? If so how important
are they and how do they propagate into the real economy?
Methodology First, I have undertaken some exploratory data analyses to doc-
ument the business cycle facts to explain. I have then undertaken some time
series analyses to find out how real variables actually respond to monetary distur-
bances. Finally, in turn, I have calibrated several theoretical growth models using
actual data and simulated them. The cyclical behavior of the simulated series is
compared to that of the actual ones.
Key Contributions I have explored the issue from multiple perspectives: em-
pirically and theoretically using a variety of competing models. Besides, all the
investigations are undertaken using Canadian data.
Findings The empirical investigations show that monetary disturbances are a
determinant of business cycle fluctuations but the way they contribute to these
fluctuations depend on the measure of money used. The theoretical models show
the channels through which monetary disturbances propagate: nominal capital
gain tax, price stickiness, deteriorating financial conditions.
Future Research To further the understanding of business cycle fluctuations
in Canada, it is important to look at other determinants a part from technolog-
ical change and monetary disturbances. Other determinants pointed to in the
literature are expectations.
51 Introduction
Business cycles are a recurring sequence of expansion, recession, and recovery.
Real business cycle (RBC) theory is largely premised on the assumptions that:
markets are perfectly competitive, prices and real wages adjust instantly to clear
simultaneously all markets, and technological change is the primary cause of the
aggregate fluctuations in the economic activity. The importance given to tech-
nological change or, in general, to supply-side factors is empirically based on the
negative correlation observed over the business cycle between gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and its implicit price (Kydland and Prescott, 1990; Cooley and Oha-
nian, 1991; Apergis et al., 1996). 1 Money should, in principle, play no role a
part from facilitating the exchange of goods and services. This idea referred to
as the classical dichotomy does not hold empirically as money and real variables
turn out to be correlated (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Barro, 1977; Blanchard,
1990). This empirical failure means prices and wages are not as flexible as posited
to clear at once markets and money plays other roles than just facilitating the
exchange of goods and services.
If money is not just a medium of exchange, in which ways does it influence
real economic activity? According to theories purporting to explain the demand
for money, it directly or indirectly yields utility to households (see Walsh, 2010,
for a review). Money-in-the-utility (MIU) models treat money as a final good
that directly yields utility. On the other hand, in shopping-time models, money
is instead an intermediate good whose role is to make shopping less time consum-
ing. Households could therefore allocate more time to leisure and consequently
increase their utility by holding larger money balances. Cash-in-advance (CIA)
models consider money as a medium of exchange that is absolutely required in
certain transactions. It thus indirectly yields utility by allowing the purchase and
consumption of goods.
Both the RBC and the new-Keynesian theories have incorporated these models
of money demand into their frameworks to provide mechanisms through which
monetary disturbances affect the real economic activity. But while the RBC theory
keeps assuming markets are perfectly competitive, the new-Keynesian theory relies
on imperfect competition and consequently on nominal price or wage rigidities as
an additional and essential channel of influence of money on real macroeconomic
variables. Empirical investigations using United States (US) micro data indicate
that prices last about six (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008) to
twelve months (Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd, 1998). The reason behind the
rigidity of prices is that it costs firms to always change them. To illustrate that
the concept of menu cost is put forward as restaurants, to change their prices,
1According to the law of demand and supply, when the supply of goods and services is high,
prices decrease for markets to clear.
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have to print new menus.
Another distinguishing feature between both schools of macroeconomic thought
is the role of technological change in business cycle fluctuations. The new-Keynesian
theory questions its importance. Mankiw (1989) argues that if business cycle were
primarily driven by technological change, then recessions would be periods of tech-
nological regress, which is counterfactual. Gali (1999) deems the RBC paradigm
empirically irrelevant because of its failure to replicate a central feature of busi-
ness cycle: the strong positive correlation between output and hours worked. He
shows that much of the fluctuations in these two variables are rather due to de-
mand shocks. Demand shocks could be preference, money demand or investment
efficiency shock. In addition, these shocks, unlike technological disturbances, gen-
erate a high positive correlation between the two variables. The evidence produced
by Gali are mitigated by Ireland (2003) who finds estimating a sticky-price model
that technological change accounts for the quasi-totality of the pre-1979 business
cycle fluctuations in the US whereas the investment efficiency shock explains most
of the post-1979 cyclical fluctuations. According to Ireland’s evidence, both money
demand and monetary policy shocks play a very small role.
To analyze monetary policy, both schools of thought use the same instruments:
initially nominal money supply and later the short-term nominal interest rate. In
the former case, the monetary authority directly controls the supply of money
whereas in the latter case money supply adjusts to the target nominal interest
rate. The monetary policy instruments can be exogenously set or allowed to adjust
to the state of the economy, particularly to output or inflation fluctuations. In
setting the money supply or the interest rate, the monetary authority can commit
to a policy rule or, at will, change its plans. Two well-known simple policy rules
are the Friedman k-percent rule (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) and the Taylor
(1993) rule. The Friedman rule suggests letting, each period, money supply grow
at at a constant rate, regardless of the business cycles. The Taylor rule suggests
raising nominal interest rate in response to the deviations of inflation and output
from their targets. It stresses nominal interest rate must be raised more than one
for one in response to a rise in inflation so that real interest rate also rises to
stabilize output. An alternative to specifying directly a policy rule such as the one
proposed by Friedman or Taylor is the targeting regime. In this framework, the
policy rule is optimally derived from the monetary authority’s objective function.
The monetary authority’s objective could be, inter alia, to minimize the volatility
of inflation and output (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler,
1999, 2000) or to maximize households’ welfare (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997,
1999).
When the monetary authority is commuted to a policy rule, both RBC theorists
(Gavin and Kydland, 1999; Flodén, 2000) and new-Keynesians (Ireland, 2003)
agree that a change in that rule has a very little impact on the cyclical behavior
7of real variables; only nominal variables are affected. Even though the impact on
real variables is small, Cooley and Hansen (1989) point out that it is significant As
far as the effectiveness of monetary policy is concerned, most RBC theorists start
sharing the new-Keynesian view that it does not just control inflation (Cooley and
Hansen, 1989; Gavin, Kydland, and Pakko, 2007).
This paper is the second volume of an attempt at explaining business cycle
in Canada using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In the
first volume, I emphasized on the role of technological change as a driving force
(Accolley, 2016). The models I dealt with were only RBC models. This volume
is about the role of monetary disturbances and demand-side factors in business
cycle fluctuations in Canada.
Previous attempts at explaining the relation between nominal and real vari-
ables in Canada include Serletis and Molik (2000), Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004),
Dib (2006), and Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007). 2 Serletis and Molik (2000)
empirically investigate the relationship between the price level, nominal and real
GDP, and fifteen alternative measures of money supply. They find none of the
broad measures of money to be a leading indicator of the economic activity. Only
some narrow measures of money appear to predict the economic activity. Ambler,
Dib, and Rebei (2004) estimate, using Canadian and US data, a small open econ-
omy DSGE model that features rigidities in nominal wages and the prices of both
domestic and imported goods. It turns out from their empirical investigations
that the Bank of Canada has historically responded less strongly to fluctuations
in output and paid too much attention to cyclical money growth in setting its
key interest rate. They then produce estimates showing that, to maximize house-
holds’ welfare, the Bank should not at all care about cyclical money growth but
respond more strongly to fluctuations in output and inflation. Dib (2006) estimate
a DSGE model that features costs of adjusting nominal price, physical capital, and
employment. They find that combining nominal and real rigidities increase the
persistence of monetary policy shocks. Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007) use a
sticky-price general equilibrium model to investigate how trend inflation, i.e. the
long-run value of inflation, affects macroeconomic variables. They model nominal
price stickiness in three different ways. Simulating their model, they find that a
rise in trend inflation lowers average output, consumption, and investment and
raises their volatility and persistence. They also find that, at higher levels of in-
flation, monetary policy is inefficient in reducing inflation volatility as the Phillips
curve becomes flatter.
To explain the relation between nominal and real variables, I have used empiri-
cal, RBC, and new-Keynesian models. The empirical investigations have consisted
in some exploratory data analyses and fitting some dynamic econometric models
to Canadian data. The exploratory data analyses show a co-movement between
2Cross and Bergevin (2012) dates the twelve recessions Canada experienced since 1926.
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money and the business cycle measured as the cyclical real GDP. The sign of this
association depends on the measure of money supply used. Whereas most narrow
measures of money are positively correlated with business cycle, the broad mea-
sures are instead negatively correlated with it. Further econometric analyses have
revealed a mutual dependence between the broad measures of money and business
cycle. This evidence obtained using detrended time series contrasts with the find-
ings of Serletis and Molik (2000) who rather used the raw data. The exploratory
data analyses also reveal important breaks in the cyclical behavior of both real and
nominal variables since the federal government and the Bank of Canada agreed in
February 1991 to meet an inflation target through monetary policy.
The RBC models I have used are:
• the tax inflation model (Cooley and Hansen, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998),
• the RBC model with endogenous money supply (Gavin and Kydland, 1999;
Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland, 2005),
• the inflation and tax code model (Gavin, Kydland, and Pakko, 2007).
The new-Keynesian models I have used are:
• the sticky price model (Yun, 1996; Ireland, 1997, 2001, 2003),
• the financial accelerator model (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999),
The inflation tax model introduces money into the neoclassical framework
using the CIA constraint, viz households are required to pay for some consumption
goods using cash. This model, compared to an equivalent cashless RBC model,
explains a higher proportion of the fluctuations in consumption and wage. But it
generates too much fluctuations in prices due to the assumption that this latter
variable is flexible. A striking feature from methods of payment surveys is the fall
in the use of cash in households’ transactions. I have used this model to investigate
the impacts of this fall. It has appeared that an economy using too little cash could
experience the same level of welfare as one using too much cash since the relation
between the two variables is U-shaped. On the other hand, inflation and welfare
are inversely related.
In the RBC model with endogenous money supply, holding money reduces
the time allocated to shopping for consumption goods. Money growth can be
exogenous or depend on past output or current money supply. This model explains
a lower share of the variability in output, consumption and the hours worked but a
higher share of labor productivity’s volatility. It has also emerged that alternative
monetary rules, i.e. varying intensity in the monetary authority’s reaction to
fluctuations in money and output, have a very little impact on the cyclical behavior
of real variables. However, they explain the break observed in the behavior of
9nominal variables. For instance, money could be pro-cyclical or countercyclical
and prices could be highly or less volatile depending on the monetary authority’s
response to output.
The inflation and tax code model is an extension of the RBC model with en-
dogenous money. It incorporates a government that sets the rules for taxing each
type of income households earn. Monetary policy is implemented following an
interest rate rule. It has turned out that taxing nominal capital gains discourages
capital accumulation and worsens the welfare costs of inflation. Monetary distur-
bances generated by shocks to inflation target add to this model’s ability to explain
the cyclical behavior of real and nominal variables. Introducing nominal capital
gain tax also adds to the volatility of real variables and lowers their correlation
with output.
The sticky price model introduces two features: capital adjustment cost to
avoid excessive investment volatility and nominal price rigidity as a channel of
propagation of monetary disturbances. Simulating this model helps conclude that
monetary policy shocks do not propagate in the absence of price stickiness. In ad-
dition to being able to account for the observed correlation between hours worked
and productivity, this model can also explain the break observed after 1991 in the
cyclical behavior of real and nominal variables.
According to the financial accelerator model, worsening credit market con-
ditions fuels recessions. This model introduces into the sticky price model en-
trepreneurs that purchase their capital stocks out of equities, i.e. internal funds,
and debts. Because of information asymmetry (financial friction), the creditors
pays an auditing cost to observe entrepreneurs’ cash flows. The external finance
premium„ i.e. the difference in the interest rate on debts and equities, is a de-
creasing function of entrepreneurs’ percentage equity holding. A change in the
elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to the percentage equity
holding significantly affects the cyclical behavior of the economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I have undertaken
some exploratory data analyses using the cyclical components of some real and
nominal macroeconomic variables. Further econometric analyses are carried out
in Section 3. This includes testing for price stickiness and computing impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks from vector autoregressive and vector error
correction models. In Sections 4 through 8, the models listed above are sketched,
calibrated using Canadian data, and then solved numerically. Section 9 concludes.
2 Business Cycle Facts
In this section, I have measured the fluctuations and co-movements in some nom-
inal and real macroeconomic variables over the business cycle. The nominal vari-
ables include: the GDP deflator, the consumer price index (CPI) excluding the
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Table 2.1: Definition of Monetary Aggregates
Aggregate Component
Monetary Base Coins and notes in circulation
Commercial bank deposits held as reserve by the central bank
M1 Coins and notes in circulation
Demand deposits
M1+ M1
Checkable saving and notice deposits
M1++ M1+
Non-checkable saving and notice deposits
M2 M1++
Fixed-term saving deposits
M2+ M2
Money market mutual funds
M2++ M2+
Saving bonds
Non-money market mutual funds
most volatile components, some short-term interest rates, and seven alternative
measures of money supply (monetary base, M1, M1+, M1++, M2, M2+, M2++).
The monetary base, M1, M1+ and M1++ are narrow measures of money and the
other aggregates are broad measures. These monetary aggregates are defined in
Table 2.1.
The real variables include the velocity of money that I have computed using the
quantity theory of money, i.e. the relation Mv = PY , where M and v designate
respectively the supply and velocity of money whereas Y and P are the real GDP
and its deflator (also known as the implicit price of GDP).
I have used the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter, to isolate the cyclical com-
ponents of the time series. I have then computed the standard deviation and
first-order autocorrelation of the detrended series to show the magnitude and per-
sistence of their fluctuations. To make the standard deviations scale invariant
and enable comparisons, I have used not the detrended series in level but their
percentage deviation from trend, except for rates. An alternative would be rather
detrending the natural logarithm of the raw time series. 3
I have also computed the correlation coefficient between cyclical real GDP and
the macroeconomic variables to see how they relate to business cycle. Variables
that are positively correlated with real GDP are said to be pro-cyclical. Those that
are negatively correlated or not at all correlated with it are respectively said to be
countercyclical and acyclical. In addition to the correlations between cyclical real
3Let Yt, t = 1, 2 . . . T designates a real time series and Yct, its cyclical component. Its
percentage deviation from trend, Yct/Yt, is a first-order Taylor series approximation of the cyclical
components of its logarithm.
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GDP and the monetary aggregates, which indicate whether money is neutral or
not, I computed the correlation between the growth in M1 and the macroeconomic
variables, in order to check whether money is super-neutral.
The following stylized facts emerge from the summary statistics reported in
Table 2.2.
1. The narrow measures of money supply (the monetary base, M1, and M1+)
are pro-cyclical whereas its broad measures are countercyclical.
2. Growth in M1 is countercyclical.
3. M1 is the most volatile measure of money supply.
4. Money velocity is pro-cyclical and more volatile than output.
5. Interest rates are pro-cyclical and less volatile than output.
6. Interest rates are negatively correlated with growth in M1.
7. Prices are countercyclical while inflation is pro-cyclical.
8. International trade, i.e.exports and and imports, and exchange rate are pro-
cyclical and more volatile than output.
9. Both prices and inflation are negatively correlated with growth in M1.
10. Both government consumption and investment are positively correlated with
growth in M1.
11. Hours worked, which are pro-cyclical, are negatively correlated with growth
in M1 while hourly earnings, which are countercyclical, are positively corre-
lated with growth in M1.
In February 1991, the federal government and the Bank of Canada jointly set
the 2% inflation-control target. Through monetary policy, the Bank committed to
bring the year-over-year growth in the consumer price index (CPI) to 3% by the
end of 1992 and finally to 2% by the end of 1995. This agreement has been re-
newed several times and is still effective. The average annual inflation rate, which
was 4.7% between 1981 and 1990, went down to 1.96% thereafter. I have broken
the sample at the end of 1990, to see how this change in the objective of mone-
tary policy affected business cycles. Table 2.3 displays the statistics summarizing
business cycles separately for the periods 1981:Q1-1990:Q4 and 1991:Q1-2015:Q4.
Gavin and Kydland (1999) undertook a similar exercise using US data. They
found no significant change in the cyclical behavior of real variables and observed
substantial changes in the variability of monetary aggregates. Unlike the US, in
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Table 2.2: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy, Percentage Deviation
from Trend of Key Variables, 1981:Q1-2015:Q4
% Standard Correlation with First-order
Variable Deviation GDP M1 Growth Autocorrelation
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 -.12 .89
Household Consumption 1.14 .84 -.16 .85
Government Consumption .94 -.06 .12 .69
Private Fixed Investment 4.9 .75 -.21 .88
Government Fixed Investment 3.42 -.04 .18 .85
Exports 3.64 .79 -.06 .79
Imports 4.87 .8 -.13 .85
Actual Hours Weekly Worked
Average .5 .77 -.07 .72
Total 1.41 .9 -.21 .9
Hourly Earnings 1.18 -.18 .06 .84
Productivity .68 .42 .17 .62
Money Supply
Monetary Base 1.59 .03 -.07 .78
M1 4.4 .4 .02 .92
M1+ 3.2 .34 -.02 .9
M1++ 2.16 -.19 -.11 .89
M2 1.73 -.26 .06 .93
M2+ 1.73 -.37 .1 .94
M2++ 1.18 -.1 -.04 .93
Money Velocity
Monetary Base 2.66 .56 -.02 .83
M1 4.14 .11 -.18 .9
M1+ 3.39 .27 -.12 .88
M1++ 3.16 .64 .01 .89
M2 2.69 .71 -.1 .88
M2+ 2.8 .74 -.1 .89
M2++ 2.23 .75 -.05 .87
Interest Rates
Overnight Rate 1.35 .56 -.12 .75
Bank Rate 1.32 .63 -.14 .8
Treasury Bills 1 Month 1.31 .61 -.11 .81
Treasury Bills 3 Month 1.3 .64 -.14 .8
Treasury Bills, 1 Year 1.23 .63 -.19 .77
Prices
GDP Deflator 1.07 -.001 .01 .8
Consumer Price Index .57 -.61 -.09 .85
Inflation .28 .11 -.07 .12
Effective Exchange Rate 4.17 .06 .05 .81
Terms of Trade 2.5 .37 -.06 .77
Canadian $ in terms of US$ 4.05 .13 -.12 .79
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Table 2.3: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy, Percentage Deviation
from Trend of Key Variables, 1981:Q1-1990:Q4 and 1991:Q1-2015:Q4
1981:Q1-1990:Q4 1991:Q1-2015:Q4
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Output (GDP) 2.18 1 .9 1.21 1 .89
Household Consumption 1.74 .94 .9 .76 .68 .79
Government Consumption .88 .21 .39 .95 -.22 .78
Private Fixed Investment 5.97 .88 .89 4.4 .65 .88
Government Fixed Investment 2.57 .19 .82 3.72 -.15 .86
Exports 3.96 .72 .72 3.5 .89 .82
Imports 6.74 .86 .85 3.91 .74 .85
Average Hours .56 .85 .76 .47 .73 .69
Total Hours 2.1 .94 .93 .98 .85 .86
Hourly Earnings 1.4 -.46 .85 1.09 .08 .84
Productivity .78 .23 .53 .64 .61 .66
Monetary Base 1.49 .38 .66 1.64 -.2 .81
M1 7.86 .56 .94 1.66 -.04 .77
M2 2.22 .06 .93 1.5 -.59 .92
Overnight Rate 1.95 .49 .7 1.01 .65 .83
Bank Rate 1.87 .58 .78 1.01 .68 .82
GDP Deflator 1.12 -.58 .9 1.05 .45 .76
Consumer Price Index .86 -.77 .92 .39 -.34 .87
Inflation .28 .28 .53 .29 .01 -.04
Terms of Trade 1.7 .32 .85 2.76 .45 .76
Canadian $ in terms of US$ 3.05 .07 .91 4.41 .18 .77
Columns (1): Percentage Standard deviation, columns (2): Correlation with
GDP, column (3): First-order autocorrelation
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Canada, the target for inflation is explicitly set and this policy impacts on real
business cycle fluctuations.
It thus emerges from Table 2.3 that after the Bank of Canada set the 2%
inflation-control target:
1. Most nominal and real variables have become less volatile,
2. The volatility of CPI has dropped by 55% and that of M1 by about 80%,
3. Both government consumption and investment, monetary base, exchange
rate and terms of trade have become more volatile,
4. Both government consumption and monetary base, M1, and M2 have become
counter-cyclical,
5. Interest rate has become more pro-cyclical and less volatile and inflation is
less persistent.
3 Some Empirical Models
The exploratory data analyses in the previous section indicates a co-movement
between cyclical money, its growth rate, and the real economic activity. In this
section, I have used some advanced econometric tools to find out whether money
causes business cycle fluctuations and, if so, how monetary policy influences the
real economic activity. Besides, according to the new-Keynesian theory, monetary
disturbances affect business cycle because prices are sticky. I have finally fitted
a price adjustment model to test for this assumption. The data used are from
Statistics Canada and cover the sample period 1981:Q1-2015:Q4.
3.1 Money and Business Cycles
Does money cause business fluctuations ? To investigate the short-run dynamic
relationship between money supply and real GDP, I have performed some bivariate
Granger causality tests. This test, first, consists in estimating by ordinary least
squares (OLS) unrestricted and restricted versions of the following reduced-form
vector autoregressive (VAR) model of order p,
yct =
p∑
i=1
a1iyc,t−i +
p∑
i=1
b1imc,t−i + c1 + ε1t (3.1a)
mct =
p∑
i=1
a2iyc,t−i +
p∑
i=1
b2imc,t−i + c2 + ε2t, (3.1b)
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where yct andmct respectively designate cyclical real GDP and money supply. The
stochastic disturbances ε1t and ε2t are assumed to be uncorrelated. The parame-
ters c1 and c2 are the intercepts. Then, one checks in turn the joint significance
of the lagged values of mct in (3.1a) and that of the yc,t−is in (3.1b) performing
F tests (for further details, see Hamilton, 1994, pp 302-9).
Before performing the F tests, I have selected p, the lag order, comparing
information criteria computed after fitting several unrestricted VAR(p) models.
Two information criteria often used are the Akaike information criterion (AIC)
and the Schwarz criterion (SC)
AICj(p) = ln
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
e2jt
)
+ 2
2p
T
SCj(p) = ln
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
e2jt
)
+
2p
T
lnT,
where ejt, j = 1, 2, are the residuals from regressing (3.1). I have used seven
alternative measures of money supply: the monetary base, M1, M1+, M1++, M2,
M2+„ and M2++. In all the cases, the VAR(2) models give the smallest SC.
The two null hypotheses of the Granger causality tests are:
H0 : b1,1 = b1,2 = · · · = b1p = 0
H′0 : a2,1 = a2,2 = · · · = a2p = 0.
Rejecting H0 would mean fluctuations in money supply cause business cycles and
rejecting H′0 would mean the latter causes the former. The test statistic is
F =
(RSSR −RSSU)/p
RSSU/(T − 2p− 1) ∼ F (p, T − 2p − 1),
where RSSR and RSSU are the residual sum of squares,
∑T
t=1 e
2
jt, from respec-
tively the restricted and unrestricted models.
It appears in Table 3.1 that the conclusions of the Granger causality tests
depend on the measure of money supply used. Fluctuations in the monetary base,
M1, and M1++ do not help predict fluctuations in real GDP. On the other hand,
M1+ and the broad measures of money supply Granger cause business cycles.
Business cycles also turn out to Granger cause fluctuations in the broad measures
of money, which points to a feedback relation, viz a mutual dependence, between
the two variables.
Figure 3.1 plots the cross-correlation function between money and real GDP.
The cross-correlation also known as dynamic correlation is the correlation be-
tween mc,t+i and yct, i = −10 . . . 0 . . . 10. I have used the aggregates M1 and
M2 as measures of money supply.
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Table 3.1: F Statistics from Granger Causality Tests
Measure of Money H0 H
′
0
Monetary Base .32 .38
M1 1.48 .57
M1+ 2.03 .53
M1++ 1.19 3.08
M2 6.93 5.51
M2+ 10.27 5.06
M2++ 5.71 6.5
F5%(10, 119) = 1.91
Quarter Interval
−10 −5 0 5 10
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
M1 M2
Figure 3.1: Cross-Correlation between Cyclical Money and GDP, Canada,
1981:Q1-2012:Q4
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It appears in Figure 3.1 that the correlations between cyclical real GDP and
both the lags and leads of cyclical M1 are not as strong as their contemporaneous
correlation, which is consistent with the absence of causality suggested by the
statistics in Table 3.1. Using M2, the correlations with the lags and leads are higher
than the contemporaneous correlation and the feedback relationship suggested by
the Granger causality tests transpires. The cross-correlations between business
cycle and cyclical M2 suggest that economic booms are caused by contractions
in M2 and followed by monetary expansions.
3.2 A Monetary Transmission Mechanism
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), I have computed some em-
pirical impulse responses to show how monetary policy influences the real eco-
nomic activity. I have used two approaches to estimate the dynamic response of
the economy to a monetary policy shock: the structural VAR and its vector error
correction representation. The econometric model used is
A0yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+Apyt−p + εt, (3.2)
where yt is a vector of nine macroeconomic policy and non-policy variables,Ai, i =
0 . . . p, are 9 × 9 matrices of coefficients, and εt is a vector of nine structural
shocks. The structural shocks are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance-
covariance matrix Σε.
The vector yt is partitioned into two, yt = [y1t,y2t]
′. The sub-vector y1t con-
sists of the natural logarithms of: real GDP, real consumption, GDP deflator (im-
plicit price), real investment, real wage, and labor productivity. The sub-vector y2t
comprises the overnight rate, the natural logarithm of real profits proxied by the
net operating surplus and the growth rate of M2. The overnight rate is the policy
variable. 4 All the variables in yt are integrated of order one, I(1) in short, viz
they are trended but their first differences are stationary. To test for the order
of integration, I have performed some augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root
tests. 5 The test results are reported in Table 3.2.
I have selected the optimal lag length to enter in (3.2) performing some speci-
fication search tests. The SC suggests one lag while the AIC suggests two. It will
be too restrictive choosing a lag length of one. 6 I have therefore followed the
suggestion of the AIC.
4The overnight rate is the interest rate on one-day loans among financial institutions. It is
the Bank of Canada’s current key rate. Its original key rate was the bank rate.
5A non-stationary time series yt following an autoregressive process of order p can be written
as follows: ∆yt = λ0+ πyt−1+λ1∆yt−1+ · · ·+λp−1∆yt−p+1+ εt. If π = 0, yt is said to be I(1)
or difference-stationary. The ADF test consists in checking the statistical significance of π. I
have included a time trend in all the tests on the level variables except for the overnight rate.
6Setting the lag length to one would mainly restrict the short-run dynamics of all variables
to error correction in long-run relations.
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Table 3.2: Statistics from ADF Unit Root Tests
Level First-Difference
Variable Lags τ -statistics Lags τ -statistics
GDP 1 -1.68 1 -5.751
Consumption 3 -2.179 2 -4.259
GDP Deflator 1 -2.369 1 -7.279
Investment 1 -2.158 1 -5.352
Wage 2 -2.327 1 -5.812
Productivity 1 -1.137 1 -9.337
Overnight Rate 4 -1.401 3 -5.747
Profit 1 -2.283 1 -7.078
M2 5 -2.873 4 -2.335
M2 Growth 3 -8.317
5%Critical Value -3.43 -2.88
The Structural VAR Approach
The structural VAR(2) model can be reduced to the following one
yt = A
−1
0 A1yt−1 +A
−1
0 A2yt−2 +A
−1
0 εt
= Λ1yt−1 +Λ2yt−2 + ut,
where Λi = A
−1
0 Ai, i = 1, 2, and ut = A
−1
0 εt. The vector of residuals ut, which
is a linear combination of the structural shocks εt, is normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix Σu,
Σu = A
−1
0 ΣεA
−1′
0 . (3.3)
One can directly estimate the matrices Λ1, Λ2, and Σu by OLS or maximum
likelihood. But, given these estimates, it is not possible to solve for the struc-
tural matrices Ai, i = 0, 1, 2, and Σε. To see why, let’s consider relation (3.3).
For 45 distinct estimates in Σu, there are 117 distinct unknown parameters: the
72 off-diagonal elements of the 9 × 9 matrix A−10 in addition to the 9 variances
and 36 distinct covariances in Σε. The matrices Ai, i = 0, 1, 2 and Σε are there-
fore said to be unidentified. Computing impulse responses becomes complicated
because of this identification issue: a change in the residual ut could stem from
any combination of the structural shocks in εt.
A way to fix the identification issue is to make assumptions called identifying
restrictions. The first identifying restrictions are that the structural shocks are
orthogonal, which implies the 36 distinct covariances in Σε are all nil and the
9 variances are equal to unity, Σε = I9. These restrictions reduce to 81 the
number of unknown parameters in the 45 equations in (3.3). There is still a
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need for 36, i.e. 81-45, additional restrictions for the model to be just-identified.
A strategy to complete the identification is the Choleski decomposition (Sims,
1980).
This decomposition consists in writing a positive definite matrix as the product
of a lower triangular matrix and its transpose. After the orthogonality restrictions,
(3.3) the variance-covariance matrix of ut becomes
Σu = A
−1
0 I9A
−1′
0 .
It then appears that Choleski decomposition is possible if one sets the 36 upper
diagonal elements of A−10 to zero, which completely solves the remaining identifi-
cation issue. This identification strategy requires ordering the variables in yt from
the least to the most endogenous. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) used
this strategy to identify the monetary policy shock. These restrictions imply that
the variables in y1t do not respond contemporaneously to monetary policy shock
and that monetary policy does not respond contemporaneously to changes in the
other two variables in y2t.
The Vector Error Correction Representation
The structural VAR(2) model can be written as follows
A0yt = A1yt−1 +A2yt−1 −A2yt−1 +A2yt−2 + εt
= (A1 +A2)yt−1 −A2∆yt−1 + εt.
Subtracting A0yt−1 from both sides of the above relation, one ends up with the
vector error correction representation of the VAR model.
A0∆yt = Πyt−1 −A2∆yt−1 + εt, (3.4)
where Π = A1 +A2 −A0.
The vector error correction model (VECM) can be used to investigate the ex-
istence of co-integration, i.e. a long-run equilibrium relationship, between money,
the short-term interest rate, and the macroeconomic non-policy variables. Co-
integration between the variables can be tested for following Johansen (1988, 1991,
1995). There are two possible tests: the eigen and the trace tests. Table 3.3 dis-
plays the statistics and critical values for these two tests.
The eigen test suggests three co-integrating relations while the trace test sug-
gests five. If the number of co-integrating relations matches the number of vari-
ables in the sub-vector y2t, one can then treat the sub-vector y1t as weakly ex-
ogenous and set additional identifying restrictions (Boswijk, 1995; Ericsson, 1995;
Pagan and Pesaran, 2008).
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Table 3.3: Statistics from Johansen Co-integration Tests
Eigen Test Trace Test
Test 5% Critical Test 5% Critical
H0 Statistic Value Statistic Value
r = 0 117.55 57.42 379.96 202.92
r = 1 79.3 52 262.41 165.58
r = 2 65.78 46.45 183.11 131.7
r = 3 38.7 40.3 117.33 102.14
r = 4 28.22 34.4 78.63 76.07
r = 5 23.57 28.14 50.41 53.12
The existence of three co-integrating relations implies there are two 9 × 3
matrices, α and β, such that the linear combination β′yt−1 is stationary and
(3.4) becomes
A0∆yt = αβ
′yt−1 −A2∆yt−1 + εt. (3.5)
The matrices α and β contain respectively the adjustment (error correction) pa-
rameters and the co-integrating vectors. These two matrices are not identifiable
because, for any nonsingular 3× 3 matrixM, it turns out αM× (βM−1)′ = αβ′.
After partitioning the matrices A0, A2, α and β, and the vector εt in a
conformable way with the vector yt = [y1t,y2t]
′, I have set some identifying re-
strictions. [
A0,11 06×3
A0,21 I3
] [
∆y1t
∆y2t
]
=
[
α1
α2
] [
β′1 β
′
2
]
yt−1
−
[
A2,11 A2,12
A2,21 A2,22
] [
∆y1,t−1
∆y2,t−1
]
+
[
ε1t
ε2t
]
(3.6)
The sub-matrix A0,12 is set to 06×3 because the variables in y1t are weakly
exogenous, viz y2 does not contemporaneously explains y1. Since the monetary
authority does not respond immediately to changes in the other two elements
in y2t, which are the real profit and money growth, I have set the sub-matrix
A0,22 to I3.
Given y2 does not contemporaneously explains y1, one can also set both the
adjustment parameters α1 and the sub-matrix A2,12 to 06×3. The vector of long-
run parameters β2 is set to I3 so that each of the variables in y2 enters one
and only co-integrating relation. Then pre-multiplying (3.6) by the inverse of the
matrix A0 gives the following marginal and conditional models
7
7To find the inverse of the matrix A0, solve the following equation
[
A0,11 06×3
A0,21 I3
]
×[
x1 06×3
x2 x3
]
=
[
I6 06×3
03×6 I3
]
, for unknown xi, i = 1 . . . 3.
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[
∆y1t
∆y2t
]
=
[
06×3 03×3
α2β
′
1 α2
]
yt−1 −
[
A−10,11A2,11 06×3
A2,21 −A0,21A−10,11A2,11 A2,22
] [
∆y1,t−1
∆y2,t−1
]
+
[
A−10,11 06×3
−A0,21A−10,11 I3
] [
ε1t
ε2t
]
,
(3.7)
where the first block represents the marginal model for the weakly exogenous vari-
ables y1t and the second block represents the conditional model of y2t given y1t.
The VECM (3.7) turns out to be a state-space model where the marginal model
is the state equation and the conditional model represents the observation equa-
tion. 8 Further restrictions can be added, setting A2,11 to 06×3 as Jacobs and
Wallis (2010) among others did, which would mean the exogenous variables fol-
low a random walk. The restrictions on the matrix A2 have consequences on the
matrix of long-run multipliers, which is the cumulative impulse response function.
To get the matrix of long-run multipliers, rearrange the structural VAR to
have
(I9 −ΛL)∆yt = A−10 αβ′yt−1 +A−10 εt,
where L designates the lag operator and Λ = −A−10 A2. For L = 1, it follows that
∆yt = (I9 −Λ)−1A−10 αβ′yt−1 + (I9 −Λ)−1A−10 εt.
Given the linear combination β′yt−1 is stationary and consequently equals zero
in the long-run, it follows from the above relation that the matrix of long-run
multiplier is
µ = (I9 −Λ)−1A−10 . (3.8)
To illustrate the matrix of long-run multipliers, let us consider a simple case
where Λ is block diagonal, i.e. A2,21 = A0,21A
−1
0,11A2,11. This matrix equals
µ =
[
(A0,11 +A2,11)
−1
06×3
− (I3 +A2,22)−1A0,21A−10,11 (I3 +A2,22)−1
]
Setting A2,12 to 06×3 implies that this matrix is block lower triangular. As Pagan
and Pesaran (2008) pointed out, the six structural shocks ε1t associated to the
exogenous variables y1t are permanent shocks and the three structural shocks
associated to y2t are transitory. Transitory shocks have no long-run effect on
exogenous variables. Given ε2t is made up of stationary shocks, one can set its
long-run impact on y2t to zero, which implies (I3 +A2,22)
−1 = 03×3.
To sum up, three identifying restrictions can be set doing co-integration anal-
ysis. First, the permanent-transitory shock decomposition suggests that the last
8For some notes on state-space models, see among others, (Hamilton, 1994, chap 13).
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Figure 3.2: VAR- and VECM-Based Impulse Responses to an Expansionary
Monetary Policy Shock (left scale: solid line, right scale: dashed line)
three columns in the matrix of long-run multipliers µ are null, which means transi-
tory shocks have no long-run effects. Second, the first sub-matrix in µ is assumed
to be block lower diagonal. Third, in the matrix of contemporaneous impacts, the
partition A−10,22 is set to I3.
The Impulse Responses
I have computed impulse responses using in turn: the Choleski decomposition
to identify the parameters in the structural VAR and the permanent-transitory
shock decomposition to identify the parameters in the VECM. In the two cases,
the impulse stems from an expansionary monetary policy, i.e. a negative shock of
one standard deviation to interest rate. The R package vars has been used (Pfaff
et al., 2008).
In Figure 3.2, what distinguishes the impulse responses from the structural
VAR (the solid lines) from those from the VECM (the dotted lines) is that in
the former case, monetary policy has no contemporaneous impact on the weakly
exogenous variables whereas in the latter case, it has no long-run effect on these
variables. This explains why the impacts from the VECMPfaff et al. (2008) are
stronger and fade out faster than in the former case.
As Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) found using US data, it appears
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock Based
on a Nine- and a Four-Variable VAR (left scale: solid line, right scale: dashed
line)
from the structural VARmodel that, after an expansionary monetary policy shock,
1. the response of output, consumption, and investment is hump-shaped and
peaks after about one and a half year,
2. the response of prices is also hump-shaped and peaks after about two years,
3. profits and money rise.
In Figure 3.3, I have compared the impulse responses of the nine-variable
VAR to those of a four-variable VAR used by Sims (1992) and Serletis and Molik
(2000). The four-variable VAR model is of order five. The responses of output
and prices to the expansionary monetary shock are also hump-shaped but peaks
later, respectively after about three and seven years. The information criteria are
much in favor of the nine-variable VAR model.
It emerges from the variance decompositions that monetary policy only ex-
plains a very little share of the fluctuations in the variables.
3.3 Price Stickiness
According to the new-Keynesian theory, monetary disturbances affect the real
economic activity because prices are sticky. There are four determinants of price
adjustment: inflation inertia, level or Phillips-curve adjustment, rate-of-change ad-
justment, and inflation shock (Gordon, 1990). According to the inertia hypothesis,
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Table 3.4: OLS Estimates of Price Adjustment Parameters, Canada,
1981:Q1-2015:Q4
AR(2) AR(3) ARMA(2,1)
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Intercept .002 4.292 .002 3.185 .003 3.513
∆ lnPt−1 .088 1.315 .092 1.375 .679 2.176
∆ lnPt−2 -.007 -.121 -.064 -.982 .015 .092
∆ lnPt−3 .118 2.028
lnYt − lnYgt .072 2.58 .066 2.348 - .09 -1.896
∆(lnPtYt − lnYgt) .55 12.363 .556 12.571 .563 13.814
εt−1 -.356 -1.158
R¯2 .621 .628 .65
AIC -1077 -1070 -1096
SC -1059 -1050 -1074
t2.5% = 1.978, t5% = 1.666
past inflation helps predict current inflation if the proportion of firms adjusting
their prices is low—see relation (7.14) on page 59. The level hypothesis relates
inflation to output gap, i.e. the level of output relative to its trend. According to
the rate-of-change hypothesis, fluctuations in prices are a constant fraction of the
excess nominal GDP growth relative to natural real GDP. I have used the following
econometric model to test for the significance of each of these determinants
∆ lnPt = a0 +
3∑
i=1
ai∆ lnPt−i + a4 ln
Yt
Ygt
+ a5∆ ln
PtYt
Ygt
+ a6εt−1 + εt, (3.9)
where the variables Pt, Yt, Ygt, and εt respectively designate the GDP deflator,
the real and natural real GDP, and the inflation shock. I have computed the
natural real GDP using the HP filter. The parameters a1, a2, and a3 measure
the extent of inertia. The higher they are, the higher is inertia, and the stickier
prices are. The level parameter a4 is expected to be positive. If prices are sticky,
they will be less sensitive to the cyclical fluctuations in real output. The rate-of-
change parameter 0 ≤ a5 ≤ 1 measures the degree of nominal rigidity. A small a5
indicates stickiness in prices and consequently a large fluctuations in real GDP.
OLS estimates of (3.9), the price adjustment equation, are displayed in Ta-
ble 3.4. I have used three hypotheses to model inflation inertia. Inflation follows:
(1) an autoregressive process of order 2, in short an AR(2) process, (2) an au-
toregressive process of order 3, and (3) an autoregressive process of order 2 and a
moving average process of order 1, in short ARMA(2, 1).
It appears in Table 3.4 that, in the absence of the lagged inflation shock εt−1,
all the inertia parameters are very low. In the ARMA(2, 1) model, inflation re-
sponse to its first lag has increased from .09 to .679 and has become statistically
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significant. The adjusted R2 coefficients and the information criteria suggest that
the ARMA process explains a higher proportion of the observed changes in the
price level.
The level effect is low and statistically significant but its sign depends on
the presence of the lagged inflation shock. It is positive, as expected, in the
AR(1) or AR(2) models but negative in the ARMA(2, 1) model. Galı and Gertler
(1999), in estimating an econometric model of the form ∆ lnPt = β1 ln (Yt/Ygt) +
β2Et∆ lnPt+1 + εt, where Et designates the expectation operator, also find a neg-
ative sign associated to the level effect. They use quarterly US data. They deem
detrended real GDP is a poor proxy for output gap and recommends instead the
use of marginal costs as the new-Keynesian Phillips curve suggests (see Appendix
B.2).
Unlike the other parameters, the rate-of-change parameter does not change
much across the models. It indicates that 56.3% of the growth in nominal demand
is incorporated into the rate of inflation. The other 43.7% results in cyclical
fluctuations in real GDP. The rate-of-change parameters is statistically significant.
4 The Inflation Tax Model
Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998) introduced money into the
indivisible labor RBC model using the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. Three
types of agents populate their economy: households, firms, and the monetary
authority. Households have their preferences defined over leisure and two types
of consumption goods: cash and credit goods. Money is absolutely required to
purchase cash goods whereas credit goods are financed out of the current period’s
income. Each time period, households have to keep money aside for next period’s
purchases of cash goods. Because inflation acts as a tax on money holdings, when
households anticipate a higher inflation, to avoid losing purchasing power, they
reduce their cash balances and consequently their future consumption of cash
goods. Cash, credit, and investment goods are produced by firms using the same
technology. Government conducts the monetary policy.
This model is used to investigate how anticipated inflation affects the long-run
values of real variables and whether the way money is supplied plays a role in
accounting for business cycles.
4.1 The Households
The representative household’s preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility
function. This utility is logarithmic in the consumption of cash goods c1t and credit
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goods c2t and linear in leisure.
9
U (c1t, c2t, lt) = a ln c1t + (1− a) ln c2t +Υ(1− lt) (4.1)
The parameters 0 < a < 1 and Υ > 0 in the utility function are respectively the
relative weight of the cash good and the relative weight of leisure. The variable lt
is the household’s labor supply and 1− lt is consequently his leisure.
The representative household faces three resource constraints
ptc1t = mt + τt (4.2a)
pt (c1t + c2t + it) +mt+1 = pt (wtlt + rtkt) +mt + τt (4.2b)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (4.2c)
The variables pt, rt, and wt are respectively the price level, real interest rate
and wage. The quantities it and kt designate respectively the real investment
and capital stock. The nominal variables mt and τt designate respectively his cash
holdings, and the lump-sum transfer of new cash issued by the monetary authority.
The parameter δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
Relation (4.2a) is the CIA constraint. It says the household’s spending on cash
goods equals the currency he carried over from the previous period and new cash
injected by the government. Relation (4.2b) is his nominal budget constraint. The
third constraint is the law of motion of capital.
The following three relations are derived from his optimizing behavior.
Υc2t = (1− a)wt (4.3a)
βEt
[
(1 + rt+1 − δ) c2t
c2,t+1
]
= 1 (4.3b)
βEt
(
c2t
c1,t+1
pt
pt+1
)
=
1− a
a
(4.3c)
Relation (4.3a) governs the intra-temporal trade-off between the consumption of
the credit good and leisure. Relation (4.3b) is the Euler condition for the optimal
consumption of the credit good. Constraint (4.2a) suggests that condition (4.3c)
is the money demand equation. In the CIA model, money demand is not sensitive
to interest rate but rather depends on inflation rate. The term pt+1/pt in (4.3c)
is thr gross inflation rate. When the representative household anticipates a higher
inflation, he immediately raises his consumption of credit goods and keeps aside
less money for next period’s consumption of cash goods.
9Linearity in leisure is based on the assumption that labor is indivisible, viz a household either
works full-time or is unemployed. Indivisible labor was introduced by Hansen (1985) following
the observation that most of the cyclical fluctuations in the aggregate hours worked are due to
changes in the number of workers rather than the average hours worked. Much details on this
can be found in the first volume of this paper.
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4.2 The Firms
Firms produce the final good Yt using physical capital Kt and labor Lt as inputs.
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas, exhibits constant returns to scale,
and is subject to stochastic technological changes.
Yt = K
α
t (ztLt)
1−α, 0 < α < 1 (4.4)
The exogenous technological change zt, also known as total factor productiv-
ity (TFP), grows deterministically at the rate γz and randomly at the rate z˜t.
The random variable z˜t follows an AR(1) process.
zt = γ
t
z exp(z˜t)
z˜t = ρzz˜t−1 + ǫzt, ǫzt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
, (4.5)
where ρ is the persistence parameter and ǫzt is the technology shock. The tech-
nology shock is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σz.
Firms are perfectly competitive and consequently maximize their profit taking
the real interest rate and wage as given
max
Kt, Lt
Kαt (ztLt)
1−α − rtKt − wtLt
Kt : rt = α
Yt
Kt
Lt : wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
.
(4.6)
It has turned out from this optimization problem that the marginal product of
each input equals its rental price.
4.3 The Monetary Authority
It supplies money Mt exogenously. Money supply can either follow the Friedman
rule, i.e. grow at the constant rate γm, or a geometric random walk process. The
general specification of the monetary rule is
Mt+1 = γm exp(ξt)Mt (4.7a)
ξt = ρmξt−1 + ǫmt, ǫmt ∼ N
(
0, σ2m
)
. (4.7b)
The money supply shock ǫmt occurs only when monetary policy is conducted
erratically.
The government budget constraint is
Tt =Mt+1 −Mt. (4.8)
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4.4 The General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium consists of a set of prices {(pt, rt, wt)}∞t=0, a state of
the world {(zt, ξt)}∞t=0, an allocation {(c1t, c2t, it, lt, kt,mt, τt)}∞t=0 for the repre-
sentative household, an allocation {(Kt, Lt, Yt)}∞t=0 for firms, and an allocation
{(Mt, Tt)}∞t=0 for the monetary authority such that:
i. {(c1t, c2t, it, lt, kt,mt, τt)}∞t=0 solves relations (4.2) and (4.3),
ii. {(Kt, Lt, Yt)}∞t=0 solves relations (4.4) and (4.6),
iii. {(Mt, Tt)}∞t=0 solves relations (4.7a) and (4.8),
iv. {(zt, ξt)}∞t=0 is governed by relations (4.5) and (4.7b),
v. capital, labor, and money markets clear, i.e. kt = Kt, lt = Lt, mt = Mt, and
τt = Tt.
The share of time allocated to labor and the real interest rate are station-
ary variables. Along the balanced growth path (BGP), consumption, investment,
physical capital, output, and real wage are constrained to grow at the same rate γz
as technological change. Price grows at the rate π. Money and government lump-
sum transfer to households grow at the rate γm = πγz.
4.5 The Calibration
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Gomme and Rupert (2007), I have
consistently assigned values to the parameters using survey data, sample averages,
and regression results.
The Capital Share It has been computed using GDP income-based estimates.
Some of these estimates, such as the net operating surplus and the consumption of
fixed capital, unambiguously remunerate the capital input and others, such as the
compensation of employees, remunerate the labor input. The rest of the estimates
are ambiguous in the sense they are both capital and labor incomes. An unknown
proportion α of the ambiguous incomes is therefore apportioned to the capital
input. At the same time, both the the unambiguous capital income and the share
of capital in the ambiguous incomes represent a proportion α of GDP. This leads
to solve the following equation for α
α =
Unambiguous capital incomes + αAmbiguous incomes
GDP
,
which implies
α =
Unambiguous capital incomes
GDP−Ambiguous incomes .
Over the sample period 1981:Q1-2015:Q4, α averaged .329.
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Table 4.1: OLS Estimates of Some Growth Rates,
Canada, 1981:Q1-2015:Q4
Variable Estimate t-ratio
GDP Deflator .007 10.146
CPI .007 16.239
Real GDP .006 8.729
M1 .022 14.547
Technological Change .003 3.751
t2.5%(138) = 1.977
The Capital Depreciation Rate Its is the ratio of the current period’s capital
depreciation to the previous period’s capital stock. The average annual deprecia-
tion rate is 5.9%, which implies a quarterly rate of 1.5%.
The Growth Rates Table 4.1 provides estimates of the quarterly average
growth rate of prices, real GDP, M1 and technological change. Two measures of
prices are used: GDP deflator and CPI excluding the most volatile components.
The estimates of technological change are residuals from the growth accounting
exercise
∆zt =
1
1− α∆ lnYt −
α
1− α∆ lnKt −∆ lnLt
= ln γz +∆z˜t.
The persistence parameter ρz is set to .95 and it follows from the growth accounting
exercise that σǫ, the standard deviation of the technology shock, is .009.
Relation (4.9) presents OLS estimates of the stochastic process followed by
M1.
∆̂ lnmt = .009 + .567∆ lnmt−1
(4.81) (8.04)
R¯2 = .317 σm = .015
(4.9)
The slope parameter in (4.9) is the estimate of ρm.
It appears in Table 4.1 that: (1) the growth rate of real GDP (output) differs
from the rate of technological change as assumed, and (2) the relation γm = γzπ
does not hold empirically. I have set π to 1.007, the gross growth rate of both the
CPI and GDP deflator, and constrained γm to equal the product of π and γz.
The Discount Factor The average investment-output ratio is .162. Along the
BGP, i = (γz + δ − 1)k. This implies a capital-output ratio of 9.113. Evaluating
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then (4.3b) along the BGP, one has
β =
γz
1 + αk/y − δ
,
which equals .982.
The Share of Cash in Households’ Consumption Following Cooley and
Hansen (1995), I have defined money as M1. All the purchases made using cash,
debit and stored-value cards, and personal check are consequently considered as
cash goods. It emerges from the 2009 and 2013 methods-of-payment survey con-
ducted by the Bank of Canada that these instruments represent respectively 59.2%
and 51.9% of the value of households’ transactions (Arango, Welte, et al., 2012;
Henry, Huynh, Shen, et al., 2015). 10 This averages 50.6%. Calling this average v,
one has
vt =
ptc1t
ptc1t + ptc2t
=
mt+1
mt+1 + ptc2t
.
Using then (4.3c) to eliminate ptc2t, one has
vt =
aβmt+1
aβmt+1 + (1− a)Etmt+2 .
Given (4.7) the above relation becomes
v =
aβ
aβ + (1− a)γzπ , (4.10)
where γzπ equals γm, the growth rate of money. Finally, solving (4.10) for a gives
a =
γzπv
β(1 − v) + γzπv ,
which equals .562.
Relation (4.10) sheds a light on the fall observed in the share of cash in the
value of households transactions. This results from a decrease in β, an increase
in either γz or π. The parameter β is the weight households put on their future
consumption. Actually, an increase in time preference, viz impatience, will cause
a decrease in β and by so doing lead households to consume more credit goods
today and less cash goods tomorrow Second, households lose purchasing power
when inflation π rises. They consequently hold less money and consume less cash
goods. Third, technological progress raises aggregate output and consequently
households’ incomes, which rather increases their consumption of credit goods.
10These means of payments accounted for 80.7% and 49.9% of the volume of transactions
respectively in 2009 and 2013.
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Table 4.2: The Baseline Parameters of the Inflation Tax Model
Households a Relative Weight of Cash Good .562
β Discount factor .982
π Inflation rate 1.007
Υ Leisure weight 2.663
Firms α Capital share .329
γz Growth rate of TFP 1.003
δ Depreciation rate .015
ρz Persistence parameter of TFP .95
σz Standard deviation of TFP shock .009
Monetary γm Money growth rate 1.01
Authority ρm Persistence parameter of money supply .567
σm Standard deviation of money supply shock .015
The Leisure Weight According to the labor force survey of Statistics Canada,
households allocate weekly, on average, 34.3 hours to labor. Censuses data indicate
that the average weeks worked is 42.57. It also emerges from the general social
survey that they daily allocate 10.45 hours to personal care. It follows that labor
represents 29.6% of the discretionary time, i.e. the time not allocated to personal
care. After computing the steady state value of all variables, the leisure weight
turns out to be 2.663. The baseline values of all the parameters are reported in
Table 4.2.
4.6 The Numerical Solution and Findings
Before solving numerically the model, all the non-stationary variables are nor-
malized, i.e. divided by their gross growth factors. Relations (A.5) present the
normalized DSGE model. I have then performed some Monte Carlo experiments
and computed impulse responses using the package Dynare in Matlab (see Griffoli,
2007, for details on Dynare). Beforehand, Dynare linearized the model using a
second-order approximation around the steady state.
The Monte Carlo experiments have consisted in simulating 100 times the model
over 140 quarters, which corresponds to the length of the time series used to
calibrate the model. The fluctuations in the variables are caused, in turn, by
technology shocks and both technology and money growth shocks. For each of the
100 samples, I have reconstructed the non-stationary variables and detrended all
variables using the HP filter. Some summary statistics have then been computed
using the detrended series. These summary statistics, which are: the standard
deviations, correlations with cyclical output and money growth, and first-order
autocorrelations, are finally averaged.
In Table 4.3, one can compare the cyclical behavior of the Canadian economy
to that of the inflation tax model. Under the Friedman rule, i.e. when money
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Table 4.3: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy and the Inflation Tax
Economy with Constant and Autoregressive Money Growth, Percentage
Deviation from Trend of Key Variables, 140 Observations
Canadian Economy
Inflation Tax Economy, Money Growth:
Constant Autoregressive
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 -.12 1.54 1 .7 1.49 1 .68 -.04
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 -.16 .47 .88 .8 .64 .65 .6 -.7
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 -.21 7.51 .99 .69 7.57 .94 .65 .26
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 -.21 1.15 .98 .69 1.12 .98 .66 -.09
Productivity 68 .42 .62 .06 .47 .88 .8 .46 .87 .79 .1
M1 4.4 .4 .92 .02 .07 .03 .96 3.42 -.001 .89 .22
Price 1.07 -.001 .8 .01 .47 -.87 .8 3.7 -.12 .81 .44
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coefficient with
output, columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient, and columns (4) Correlation
coefficient with money.
growth is constant, the model replicates most of the cyclical fluctuations observed
in output, hours worked, and productivity. Its cyclical behavior is similar to that
of the cashless indivisible labor model (see Accolley, 2016, for the comparison).
However it explains a higher proportion of the fluctuations in consumption and
productivity.
The cyclical behavior of the real variables does not change much when money
growth becomes stochastic, except that consumption has become more volatile and
less pro-cyclical. The money growth shock has improved the ability to replicate
the volatility of money. But the predicted correlation between money and output
is almost zero. Allowing technology and money growth shocks to be positively cor-
related makes money pro-cyclical but lowers the volatility of consumption, labor,
and output. Because the price level is flexible, its volatility is too high.
The model does not well replicate the correlations with money growth. The
correlation between money growth and investment is not correctly signed. The
generated correlation between money growth and consumption is too high. So
are the ones between money growth and the nominal variables. Moreover, the
generated correlation between hours worked and productivity is .74 whereas the
actual one is -.01.
I have performed other Monte Carlo simulations to study the impacts of a
greater anticipated inflation or persistence of money growth. It has turned out
that, when money growth is constant, a higher anticipated inflation has no impact
on the cyclical behavior of real variables but increases the volatility of nominal
variables. In Table 4.4, I have reported the cyclical behavior of the model following
a 5% increase in the parameters π and ρm when money growth is autoregressive.
A higher expected inflation lowers the volatility of consumption. A rise in the
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Table 4.4: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy and the Inflation Tax
Economy with Autoregressive Money Growth, Percentage Deviation from Trend
of Key Variables, 140 Observations
Canadian Economy
Inflation Tax Economy, 5% Increase in:
Inflation Money Persistence
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 1.49 1 .68 1.49 1 .68
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .63 .65 .6 .66 .64 .6
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 7.56 .94 .65 7.58 .93 .65
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 1.12 .98 .66 1.12 .98 .66
Productivity 68 .42 .62 .46 .87 .79 .46 .86 .79
M1 4.4 .4 .92 5.61 .01 .94 3.57 -.003 .89
Price 1.07 -.001 .8 5.41 -.06 .89 3.85 -.12 .82
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coefficient with
output, columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient.
persistence of money growth raises the volatility of real variables and lowers their
correlation with output. Figure 4.1 shows the responses of the inflation tax econ-
omy to money growth shocks for two different values of ρm.
4.7 The Welfare Analysis
A higher expected inflation only affects the short-run dynamics of consumption
and nominal variables but it lowers the steady state and the average values of
consumption, investment, hours worked, output, and money as Table 4.5 shows.
When expected inflation rate is 5.7% instead of zero, consumption, investment,
hours worked, and output all are, at steady state, 3% lower. The fall in the
consumption of cash goods is 5.4%. Since all the other parameters have remained
unchanged, the fall in consumption is only attributable to cash goods. Credit
goods, real interest rate, and wage do not change. Even though hours worked
fall and leisure consequently increases, households suffer an instantaneous welfare
loss. This loss is calculated solving the following equation
U (c˜1, c˜2, l)
∣∣
π=1
= U (c˜∗1 +∆c˜, c˜2, l∗)
∣∣
π={1.007,1.057}
,
with (c˜1t, c˜2t) = (c1t, c2t)/γ
t. The left-hand side (lhs) element is the level of utility
attained at steady steady when the inflation rate is zero and the variables c˜∗1 and
l∗ on the right-hand side (rhs) are respectively the steady state consumption and
hours worked when the inflation rate is either .7% or 5.7%. The compensating
variation ∆c˜ indicates, when trend inflation occurs, by how much the consumption
of cash good has to increase to keep the utility unchanged. The welfare costs of
inflation in Table 4.5 are the compensating variation expressed as a percentage of
aggregate consumption or output. They are not that high but increase along with
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses to Money Growth Shock, Deviation form Steady
State, the Inflation Tax Model
inflation. When expected inflation is 5.7%, the welfare cost of inflation represents
.89% of steady state consumption.
I have finally investigated a new issue: the impacts of changes in the weight of
cash good. This is motivated by the fall observed over time in the use of cash as
a method of payment. A fall in a lowers the consumption of cash good and raises
the consumption of credit good. Aggregate consumption increases because the
rise in the consumption of credit good is higher. While investment, hours worked,
and output increase, the demand of money decreases as the result of the fall in
the consumption of the cash good. The relationship between welfare and the use
of cash is U-shaped as it appears in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2.
5 The RBC Model with Endogenous Money Supply
An alternative attempt to explain money demand is the shopping time model. It
represents money as an intermediate good that households keep to reduce the time
spent shopping for consumption goods. Gavin and Kydland (1999) introduced this
model into the neoclassical growth framework to explain the relative instability
in the cyclical behavior of US nominal variables due to a major change in the
objectives of monetary policy that took place in 1979.
The model consists of households, firms, and a monetary authority. House-
holds’ behavior is described by the shopping time model. Firms behave the same
way as in the inflation tax model— see Subsection 4.2. The monetary authority
could supply money in various ways: either exogenously or endogenously taking
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Table 4.5: Steady State and Average Values Associated with Different Values of
Expected Inflation, the Inflation Tax Model
π=1 π=1.007 π=1.057
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Output .878 .879 .875 .876 .851 .853
Consumption .736 .737 .733 .734 .714 .714
Investment .142 .143 .142 .142 .138 .138
Hours .297 .297 .296 .296 .288 .288
Wage 1.983 1.984 1.983 1.984 1.983 1.984
M1 .409 .414 .403 .408 .366 .37
Welfare .879 .878 .872
Welfare Costs: 100× ∆C˜
C
0 .08 .7
100× ∆C˜
Y˜
0 .067 .58
Columns (1) Steady state value, columns (2) Average value of the sim-
ulated series
Table 4.6: Steady State and Average Values Associated with Different Values of
the Weight of Cash Good, the Inflation Tax Model
a=.8 a=.562 a=.4
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Output (GDP) .869 .87 .875 .876 .879 .88
Consumption .728 .729 .733 .734 .737 .737
Investment .141 .141 .142 .142 .142 .143
Hours .294 .294 .296 .296 .297 .298
Wage 1.983 1.984 1.983 1.984 1.983 1.984
M1 .574 .581 .403 .408 .29 .37
Welfare 1.062 .878 .892
Columns (1) Steady state value, columns (2) Average value of the
simulated series
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Figure 4.2: The Weight of Cash Good and Welfare, the Inflation Tax Model
into account the past level of output and the current stock of money. 11 Gavin
and Kydland showed that money and prices could be either pro-cyclical or coun-
tercyclical depending on how intensely the monetary authority responds to last
period’s output level or current period money stock. My goal is to use this model
to explain the changes in the cyclical behavior of variables that occurred after
the Bank of Canada set the 2% inflation-control target in February 1991. These
changes are reported in Table 2.3.
5.1 The Households
The representative household has preferences defined over consumption and leisure.
Leisure is the share of time that has not been allocated to labor or shopping. These
preferences are represented by a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
utility function.
U(ct, lt, st) = 1
e
cet (1− lt − st)υe , (5.1)
where e < 1 and υ > 0 are respectively the substitution parameter and the relative
leisure weight. The variable st designates the share of time allocated to shopping.
He faces three constraints, which are respectively the transaction or shopping
11In another version of the same model, the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule
(Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland, 2005).
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technology, the budget constraint, and the law of motion of capital
st = ω0 − ω1
(
mt
ptct
)ω2
(5.2a)
pt (ct + it) +mt+1 = pt (wtlt + rtkt) +mt + τt (5.2b)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + i.t (5.2c)
Restricting in (5.2a) the curvature parameter, ω2, to be negative and ω1 to have the
same sign ensure the shopping time positively depends on the consumption velocity
of money ptct/mt, viz the higher the money holdings, the lower their velocity or
how often transactions occur, which reduces shopping time. The following three
conditions are derived from the representative household’s utility maximization
problem
1− lt − ω0 + (1− υω2)ω1
(
mt
ptct
)ω2
= υ
ct
wt
(5.3a)
βEt
[
(1 + rt+1 − δ)
(
ct+1
ct
)e(1− lt+1 − st+1
1− lt − st
)υe−1 wt
wt+1
]
= 1 (5.3b)
βEt
[
pt
pt+1
wt
wt+1
+ ω1ω2
ptwt
mt+1
(
mt+1
pt+1ct+1
)ω2]
×
(
ct+1
ct
)e(1− lt+1 − st+1
1− lt − st
)υe−1
= 1. (5.3c)
Relations (5.3a) through (5.3c) respectively govern the optimal consumption-
leisure, the consumption-investment, and the money-time trade-offs.
5.2 The Monetary Authority
The general specification of the monetary policy rule is
∆ lnMt+1 = νy ln
Yt−1
Y
+ νm ln
Mt
M
+ ξt (5.4)
where νy and νm are respectively the response to last period’s output and current
money stock, ξt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ
)
is the money growth shock. The parametersM and Y
are respectively the values of money and output along the BGP. For νy = 0, money
supply is exogenous and for νy = νm = 0, it follows a random walk.
5.3 The Calibration
The dynamic system consists of relations (5.2) through (5.4) and relations (4.4)
through (4.6). As earlier, output, consumption, investment, capital, and wage are
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constrained to grow at the gross rate γz and prices grow at the gross rate π. The
values of the parameters α, γz, δ, π, ρz, and σz are taken from Table 4.2. I have
set the parameters ω2 to -1.
The average consumption velocity of money, pc/m, is 3.04. The values of β
and ω1 are set evaluating along the BGP (5.3b) and (5.3c)
β =
γ1−ez
1 + αk/y − δ
ω1 =
πγ1−ez − β
βω2(1− α)yl
(
m
p
)1−ω2
cω2 ,
which gives, after setting e to .3, β = .981 and ω1 = −.001.
According to the general social survey of Statistics Canada, a households allo-
cate, on average, .8 hour a day to shopping for consumption goods and services.
This represents 5.9% of their discretionary time. Given the average shopping
time, one can solve (5.2a) and (5.3a) for υ and ω0, which respectively turn out to
equal 1.728 and .0556.
The parameters νy and νm are chosen by the monetary authority. To have an
idea of their historical values, I have estimated (5.4) abstracting from the trend
regressors.
̂∆ lnMt+1 = .004 ln Yt−1 − .0024 lnMt
(1.787) (−1.028)
R¯2 = .602 σξ = .018
(5.6)
The intercept term in (5.6), which represents −(νy lnY + νm lnM), is not statis-
tically significant and has been dropped.
5.4 The Welfare Costs of Inflation
The welfare costs of inflation are calculated solving the following equation
U (c˜, l, s) ∣∣
π=1
= U (c˜∗ +∆c˜, l∗, s∗) ∣∣
π={1.007,1.057}
, (5.7)
where c˜ denotes the normalized consumption at steady state when trend inflation
is zero. The variables with asterisk are the consumption and use of time when
trend inflation is non-zero. The compensating variation is denoted by ∆c˜.
At steady state, a 5.7% trend inflation causes a .8% fall in consumption, invest-
ment, hours worked, and output. This is much lower than the 3% fall generated by
the inflation tax model in Section 4. However, comparing Table 5.1 to Table 4.5,
it turns out that the welfare cost of inflation is higher in this model. It represents
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Table 5.1: Steady State Values Associated with Different Values of Expected
Inflation, the RBC Model with Endogenous Money
Variable π=1 π=1.007 π=1.057
Output .876 .875 .869
Consumption .734 .733 .728
Investment .142 .142 .141
Hours .296 .296 .294
Wage 1.983 1.983 1.983
M1 .277 .241 .148
Welfare 1.661 1.66 1.655
Welfare Costs: 100× ∆C˜
C
0 .144 .902
100× ∆C˜
Y˜
0 .121 .756
.9% of steady state consumption versus .7% in the inflation tax model. The fact
is that, in the inflation tax model, inflation only affects one type of consumption:
the cash good.
When trend inflation is lower, precisely for π = 1.007, the welfare costs of
inflation are nearly the double of the ones from the inflation tax model. The
difference between the estimates from these two models decreases as the trend
inflation rises.
5.5 The Impulse Responses
The responses of some variables to a positive money growth shock is plotted in
Figure 5.1. The solid lines are the impulse responses that correspond to the
historical value of νm, which is -.002, and the dotted lines are associated to a
lower value of this parameter.
The parameter νm plays an important role in the magnitude of the responses
of nominal and real variables to a monetary policy shock. Both nominal money
supply and prices rise, after the expansionary money policy shock, and then grad-
ually return to their steady state value. But their responses are less stronger and
fade out more rapidly when νm is lower. Actually, νm determines the persistence
in the growth of money supply. This parameter could well explain the break that
appears in Table 2.3 in the cyclical behavior of nominal variables. As far as the
real variables are concerned, consumption, interest rate, hours worked, and output
peak higher when νm is lower, which is not the case for investment and wage.
The responses of output, hours worked, and wage turn out to be the opposite
of those predicted by the inflation tax model (see Figure 4.1). This is due to the
fact that money plays different role in the two models. In this model, money is an
intermediate good used to reduce the time allocated to shopping, which explains
why hours worked rise after the expansionary monetary policy shock.
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Figure 5.1: Impulse Responses to Money Growth Shock, Deviation form Steady
State, the RBC model with Endogenous Money Supply (νy = .0682 and
σξ = .017)
5.6 The Cyclical Properties
The summary statistics (standard deviations and correlation coefficients) in Ta-
ble 5.2 are averages from 100 simulations of the model economy. Each simulation
consists of 140 observations, which corresponds to the length of the sample used
to calibrate the model. The second block of this table shows the cyclical be-
havior of the model economy when the stock of money is held fixed, i.e. when
νy = νm = σξ = 0 and only technology shocks drive business cycles. The third
block displays the cyclical behavior when money is endogenous. In both cases, the
elasticity of substitution parameter, e, is set to .3. A higher e will raise volatility
but will lower the correlation between output and consumption.
When money supply is held fixed, the model explains 87% of output volatility.
Compared to the inflation tax model (see Table 4.3), this model explains a lower
share of the fluctuations in output, consumption, and hours worked. It explains
82% of the volatility in labor productivity, which is higher than in the inflation
tax model. The cyclical behavior of the nominal variables (money and prices)
is the same in the two models, when money growth is constant. The simulated
correlation between hours worked and productivity, which is .57, is still high.
When money becomes endogenous and stochastic, business cycles are driven
by both technology and money growth shocks. I have set νm to -.068 and νy
to .0682 to have the model replicate 91% of the fluctuations in the price level and
all its correlation with output. The share of the volatility in money rose to 48%.
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Table 5.2: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy and the RBC Model with
Fixed Money Supply, Percentage Deviation from Trend of Key Variables, 140
Observations
Canadian Economy
RBC Economy
Fixed Money Endogenous Money
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 1.35 1 .7 1.35 1 .69
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .35 .37 .95 .35 .36 .95
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 7.92 .97 .68 7.94 .97 .67
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 .87 .96 .68 .87 .96 .67
Productivity 68 .42 .56 .56 .92 .78 .56 .91 .78
M1 4.4 .4 .92 .07 .03 .96 2.13 .03 .68
Price 1.07 -.001 .8 .48 -.89 .8 .97 -.001 .68
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coeffi-
cient with output, and columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient.
5.7 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 5.2 shows the sensitivity of the cyclical behavior of money and the price level
to the response coefficients νm and νy. Each data point is the average from 100
simulations of the model economy. In p,panels 1 and 2, money growth only depends
on both the deviation of real output from trend and the monetary disturbances,
viz νm is set to zero and νy varies between -.2 and .2. In panels 3 and 4, νy is held
constant at .0682 and νm is varied between -.4 and 0.
It appears in Panel 1 that, when money supply growth is countercyclical, the
volatility of the price level decreases as νy increases. After money supply growth
has become pro-cyclical, precisely from νy = .04, the volatility of the price level
starts increasing along with this policy parameter. The volatility of money follows
a similar pattern but is lower than that of the price level. The price level could
be countercyclical or pro-cyclical depending on the magnitude of νy (Panel 2). It
becomes procyclical at νy = .04. where its volatility is the lowest.
When the policy parameter νy is held constant, Panel 3 shows that the standard
deviation of money and prices behave differently as νm increases. The standard
deviation of the price level is v-shaped and reaches its lowest value of νm = −.06.
For νm between -.4 and -.2, money is less volatile than the prices. Panel 4 shows
that money is pro-cyclical and the price level is countercyclical as long as νm is
less or equal to -.06.
Changes in the monetary policy rule affect the correlation between some real
variables. Figure 5.3 shows the sensitivity of the correlation between hours worked
and shopping time to each of the two policy parameters νm and νy. When νm is
set to zero and νy is less than .02, both variables are negatively correlated (the
lhs panel). This means when money supply growth is countercyclical or slightly
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pro-cyclical and households save time on shopping, they do not increase the time
they allocate to leisure but instead increase their hours worked. The rhs panel also
shows that for νm lower than or equal to -.14 households substitute hours worked
for shopping time.
6 The Inflation and Tax Code Model
This is an extension to a government with a nominal tax code of the RBC model
with endogenous money supply sketched in Section 5. Each time period, for each
type of income earned by households, the government exogenously sets the percent-
age that must be remitted as tax. Capital and labor incomes, coupon payments,
i.e. interests on bonds, and capital gains are the incomes taxed. There are two
types of capital gains: the accrued and the realized gains. The tax code specifies
which one to tax. In the first scenario, the accumulated gains are taxed straight
away whereas, in the second one, taxation is shifted into the future.
Instead of a money supply rule, the monetary authority uses the interest rate
rule to achieve the inflation target. Gavin, Kydland, and Pakko (2007) use this
model to study the interaction between inflation and the tax code. At steady
state, they find that the welfare cost of inflation is higher when nominal capital
gains is taxed. As a matter of fact, taxing capital gains discourages investment,
which occasions an economic downturn. Suppressing the possibility to postpone
the realization of capital gains, i.e. taxing instead the accrued gains, adds to the
welfare cost. Over the business cycle, they find that the nominal capital gain tax
is a propagation channel for inflation shocks. When shocks to trend inflation are
highly persistent, inflation interacts with the nominal capital gain tax to generate
high volatility in real variables and lower their correlation with output. Here, I
only deal with the accrual-based taxation of capital gains.
6.1 The Households
The representative household’s preferences are described by (5.1). Two of the
constraints he faces remain unchanged: (5.2a) the shopping technology and (5.2c)
the law of motion of physical capital. His nominal budget constraint is replaced
with the following relation
Pt(Ct + It) +Bt+1 +Mt+1 + τgtGt =Mt + Tt + (1− τlt)PtwtLt
+ [(1− τkt)qt + τktδ]PtKt
+ [1 + (1− τbt)(Rt − 1)]Bt (6.1a)
Gt = (Pt − Pt−1)Kt. (6.1b)
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The rhs elements of (6.1a) indicate the sources of the representative household’s
income: money balances carried from the previous period, a tax refund and lump-
sum transfer from the government Tt, the after-tax labor and capital incomes, the
face value of the bonds he holds Bt, and the after-tax coupon payments. The
variables qt and Rt respectively denote the real rental price of capital and the
gross nominal interest rate on bonds. The exogenous parameters τbt, τkt, and τlt
are respectively the tax rates on bond yields, labor and capital incomes. The
depreciated capital is not taxed.
The elements of (6.1a) show how he uses his after-tax incomes: buying con-
sumption and investment goods, and bonds, keeping money aside for transactions,
and paying tax on accrued capital gains. The capital gain Gt is specified in (6.1b)
and the parameter τgt denotes the tax rate on this gain.
The representative household’s optimal supply of labor, demand for money
and investment, and the no-arbitrage condition are governed by the following four
relations. The no-arbitrage condition indicates that holding bonds or physical
capital yields the same after-tax real return.
1− Lt − ω0 + (1− υω2)ω1
(
Mt
PtCt
)ω2
= υ
Ct
(1− τlt)wt (6.2a)(
Mt
Pt
)ω2−1
=
1− τbt
1− τlt
Rt − 1
wt
Cω2t
ω1ω2
(6.2b)
βEt
[
1 + (1− τk,t+1) (qt+1 − δ) − τg,t+1
(
1− Pt
Pt+1
)]
×
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e(1− lt+1 − st+1
1− lt − st
)υe−1 1− τlt
1− τl,t+1
wt
wt+1
= 1 (6.2c)
Et
{[
1 + (1− τk,t+1) (qt+1 − δ)− τg,t+1
(
1− Pt
Pt+1
)]
Pt+1
Pt
}
= 1
+Et(1− τb,t+1)(Rt+1 − 1) (6.2d)
The term τgt+1(1 − Pt/Pt+1) in relations (6.2c) and (6.2d) shows the interaction
of inflation with capital gain tax, which provides an additional mechanism that
generates and propagates business cycle fluctuations.
6.2 The Government
The monetary authority, on behalf of the government, sets the nominal interest
rate. It adjusts this key rate to deviations of inflation and its target from the
BGP. The inflation target is stochastic but stationary, viz it fluctuates around the
midpoint of a target range.
ln
Rt+1
R
= (1 + νπ) ln
πt
π
− νπ ln γpt
γp
(6.3a)
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ln γpt = ln(1− ρπ)γp + ρπ ln γp,t−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ
)
(6.3b)
The response coefficient νπ is positive and large enough for the model to have a
solution.
The government collects taxes that are then entirely rebated to households. It
prints new money, Mt+1−Mt, that is also transfered to households. The supply of
money is endogenously determined from (6.2b), the money demand relationship.
The government budget is therefore
Tt = τbt(Rt − 1)Bt + τgtGt + τkt(qt − δ)PtKt + τltPtwtLt +Mt+1 −Mt. (6.4)
6.3 Calibration
The following relations make up the DSGE model:
- relations (6.2a)-(6.2d) from the representative household’s optimization prob-
lem and the constraints (5.2a), (5.2c), and (6.1a)-(6.1b).
- the aggregate production technology (4.4), the law of motion of TFP (4.5),
and the two FOCs from firms’ profit maximization problem: qt = αYt/Kt
and wt = (1− α)Yt/Lt,
- the monetary policy rule (6.3a)-(6.3b),
- the government budget (6.4).
At equilibrium, the household specializes in investing in capital goods and will not
acquire any bond, Bt = 0.
As previously, the share of time allocated to labor and shopping are stationary.
So are the rental price of capital, the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, and
the tax rates. Consumption, investment, capital, output, and wage grow at the
gross rate γz along the BGP. Prices grow at the gross rate π = γp. The nominal
variables grow at the rate γzπ.
The parameters α, γz, δ, π, ρz, σz, and ω2 remain unchanged. The remaining
parameters β, ν, τb, τg, τk, τl, ω0, and ω1 are set in a way that the model replicate
along the BGP some sample averages.
The Tax Rates The average of some income tax rates released by the Fraser
Institute is .305 (Palacios and Lammam, 2013; Palacios, Lammam, and Ren, 2015).
This average is used to calculate the tax rate on labor income using income-based
GDP estimates. Letting τ¯ denote the average income tax rate, one roughly has
τl =
τ¯ × wages and salaries
wages and salaries + employers’ social contributions
,
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which equals .2689.
I have related the tax rate on capital income to the two previous tax rates as
follows: τk = [τ¯ − (1− α)τl]/α. This gives τk = .3788.
In Canada only half of capital gains is taxed. The effective tax rate on this
income is therefore
τg =
τ¯ G2
G
=
τ¯
2
= .1525.
To compute τb, the tax rate on bond incomes, I have evaluated (6.2d) along
the BGP, which gives
I
Y
=
α(γz + δ − 1)(1 − τk)π
(1− τb)(R − 1) + δ(1− τk)π − (1− τg)(π − 1) . (6.5)
The average three-month treasury bill rate is 5.64% per annum over 1981-2015.
This is equivalent to a quarterly rate of 1.4%. The average of the Bank of Canada’s
key rate, the overnight rate, is also almost the same. I have therefore set R to 1.014.
Given the investment-output ratio, one can solve (6.5) for τb. The investment-
output ratio used so far, .162, is the share of business investment in GDP. This ratio
now turns out too low and yields a negative bond income tax rate. Using instead
the sum of households’ final consumption expenditure and business investment as
the measure of output, the investment-output ratio I/(C + I) becomes .237 and
the solution of (6.5) becomes correctly signed, τb = .1725.
The Discount Factor One get this parameter using either relation (6.2c) or
the following relation, which is a combination of (6.2c) and (6.2d)
(1− τb)(R − 1) = πγ
1−e
z
β
− 1.
The substitution parameter e is set to .395 as in Section 5.
The Leisure Weight and Shopping Technology Parameters Given the
average consumption velocity of money, which is 3.04, and the share of time allo-
cated to shopping, which is .0556, one can solve relations (5.2a), (6.2a), and (6.2b)
to get the values of υ, ω0, and ω1. These values are reported in Table 6.2.
The Persistence of Inflation Stochastic Trend I have regressed the natural
logarithm of trend inflation on its first lag to get estimates of ρπ. Trend inflation
is measured using the HP filter. It appears in Table 6.1 that its persistence was
lower during the sub-period 1991:Q1-2015:Q4.
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Table 6.1: OLS Estimates of Relation (6.3b), the Stochastic Process of Trend
Inflation, Canada, 1981: Q1-2015:Q4
Parameter
1981:Q1-2015:Q4 1981:Q1-1990:Q4 1991:Q1-2015:Q4
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Intercept -.0231 -12.81 -.0107 -4.68 -.061 -10.87
Persistence .975 372.61 .941 124.19 .929 131.31
R¯2 .9999 .9976 .9943
σξ .015 .0106 .0123
t2.5%(137) = 1.977 t2.5%(37) = 2.026 t2.5%(98) = 1.984
Table 6.2: The Baseline Parameters of the Inflation and Tax Code Model
Households β Discount factor .997
π Inflation rate 1.007
υ Leisure weight 1.395
ω0 Shopping technology, intercept .057
ω1 Shopping technology, slope -.006
ω2 Shopping technology, curvature -1
Firms α Capital share .329
γz Growth rate of TFP 1.003
δ Depreciation rate .015
ρz Persistence parameter of TFP .95
σz Standard deviation of TFP shock .009
Government ρpi Persistence parameter of inflation .975
τb Bond income tax rate .173
τg Capital gain tax rate .153
τk Capital income tax rate .379
τl Labor income tax rate .269
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Table 6.3: Percentage Change in Steady State Values and Welfare Costs of
Inflation, the Inflation and Tax Code Model
No Taxes No Capital Gain Tax The Four Taxes
π = 1.007 π = 1.057 π = 1.007 π = 1.057 π = 1.007 π = 1.057
Output -.145 -.694 -.155 -.742 -4.88 -26.751
Consumption -.145 -.694 -.155 -.742 -2.75 -17.651
Investment -.145 -.694 -.155 -.742 -11.136 -53.478
Hours -.145 -.694 -.155 -.742 -1.653 -8.487
Wage 0 0 0 0 -3.281 -19.957
Welfare cost:
100× ∆C
C
.148 .714 .185 .889 1.807 12.934
100× ∆C
Y
.105 .504 .138 .663 1.348 9.649
6.4 The Welfare Costs of Inflation
The welfare costs are computed using relation (5.7). Three scenarios are consid-
ered: (1) no income is taxed„ i.e. τb = τg = τk = τl = 0, (2) all incomes except
capital gains are taxed, i.e. τb, τk, τl assume the values reported in Table 6.2 but
τg = 0, and (3) all incomes are taxed. All the other parameters have remained
unchanged. The results are displayed in Table 6.3.
Comparing the results from the first scenario to those from the second one
shows that introducing only bond, labor, and capital income taxes slightly raises
the welfare costs of inflation. In the absence of any tax, the welfare cost of inflation
represents .714% of the steady state consumption, when trend inflation is 5.7%.
When the three aforementioned taxes are introduced, it goes up to .889%. These
results are close to those in Table 5.1, which are obtained with different values
assigned to the parameters β, υ, ω0, and ω1.
The welfare cost of inflation substantially increases when capital gains are
taxed. It rises to 12.9% of steady state consumption when trend inflation is 5.7%
instead of zero. This dramatic effect of inflation stems from the fact that taxing
capital gain discourages investment, which falls by 53.5%.
6.5 The Impulse Responses
Figure 6.1 plots the response of some variables to a one-off negative shock of one
standard deviation to trend inflation. This represents an expansionary monetary
policy as it lowers the nominal interest rate. To see this clearly, consider rela-
tion (6.3a), the interest rate rule. Given, after normalizing prices, one can express
the gross inflation rate as follows, πt = γptP¯t//P¯t−1, relation (6.3a) becomes
ln
Rt+1
R
= ln
γpt
γp
+ (1 + νπ) ln
P¯t
P¯t−1
.
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Figure 6.1: Impulse Responses to a Negative Inflation Shock, Deviation form
Steady State, the Inflation and Tax Code Model
A negative shock to trend inflation thus lowers the nominal interest rate as
it appears in panel 6 of Figure 6.1. The dotted and solid lines in Figure 6.1
are respectively the impulse responses associated to the periods 1981-1990’ and
1991-2015’s estimates of inflation persistence.
After the inflation shock, consumption and wage immediately fall whereas
money, investment, hours worked, and output rise. These impacts are similar to
those in Figure 5.1 where monetary policy is implemented by controlling directly
the growth of money supply. Comparing these two figures also shows that the
impact of a rise in inflation persistence on the impulse responses of real variables
especially consumption, wage, and output do not fade out as quickly as those of
a rise in the persistence of money supply.
As in Section 5, the responses of hours worked, wage, and output are the
opposite of those from the inflation tax model plotted in Figure 4.1. This stems
from the role money plays in this model: an intermediate good used to save
time while shopping. When inflation rises, households immediately reduce their
consumption and as a consequence the time they allocate to shopping. They
could then allocate more time to labor, which immediately raises output. Real
wage decreases as a result of the increase in labor supply.
6.6 The Cyclical Properties
I have here investigated two issues, which are the contribution to business cycle
fluctuations of: (1) monetary disturbances, and (2) nominal capital gain tax. I
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Table 6.4: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy and the Inflation and
Tax Code Economy, Percentage Deviation from Trend of Key Variables, 140
Observations
Canadian Economy
Inflation and Tax Code Economy
TFP Shock TFP and Inflation Shocks
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 1.25 1 .7 1.3 1 .7
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .21 .9 .75 .5 .13 .69
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 4.72 1 .7 5.6 .95 .69
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 .72 1 .7 .91 .92 .69
Productivity .68 .42 .62 .53 .99 .71 .57 .8 .71
M1 4.4 .4 .92 2.12 -.89 .72 4.05 -.17 .69
Inflation .28 .11 .12 .05 .95 .71 .12 .15 .69
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coeffi-
cient with output, and columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient.
have furthered the latter issue checking whether its importance depends on the
persistence in the inflation target shock.
To simulate the model, I have set the monetary authority’s response to infla-
tion, νπ, to .31. The estimated standard deviations of the shock to inflation target
reported in Table 6.1 are too high and gives explosive solutions. To avoid this, I
have lowered them to .001. The elasticity of substitution parameter e is set to .2
to make sure that consumption is always pro-cyclical and its volatility is as high
as possible.
The contribution of monetary disturbances To investigate this issue, I have
performed two Monte Carlo experiments: one with only technology shocks and the
other with both technology and inflation shocks. The inflation shocks generate the
monetary disturbances.
It appears in Table 6.4 that in the absence of monetary disturbances, the
model explains about 81% of the fluctuations in output and only 24% of those
in consumption. Introducing monetary disturbances has added to its ability to
explain the fluctuations in consumption. The model now explains 42% of the
fluctuations in consumption and 83% of the fluctuations in output. The share of
the volatility in hours worked explained rises from 51% to 64%. The standard
deviations of productivity and money also rise to get closer to observations. The
explained standard deviation of inflation as well as its correlation with output
have improved. It has also turned out that the correlation between output and
the other variables has fallen. The data generated are less persistent than observa-
tions, except for inflation. The model does not replicate the absence of correlation
between productivity and hours worked. Its prediction is .5.
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Table 6.5: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian Economy and the Inflation and
Tax Code Economy, Percentage Deviation from Trend of Key Variables
Canadian Economy
Inflation and Tax Code Economy
No Capital Gain Tax All Taxes
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel 1 (1981-2015)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 1.26 1 .7 1.3 1 .7
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .27 .75 .78 .5 .13 .69
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 4.43 .99 .69 5.6 .95 .69
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 .73 .99 .69 .91 .92 .69
Productivity .68 .42 .62 .54 .99 .71 .57 .8 .71
M1 4.4 .4 .92 12.35 -.14 .68 4.05 -.17 .69
Inflation .28 .11 .12 .29 .21 .69 .12 .15 .69
Panel 2 (1991-2015)
Output (GDP) 1.21 1 .89 1.24 1 .69 1.23 1 .69
Consumption .76 .68 .79 .23 .82 .79 .32 .58 .69
Investment 4.4 .65 .88 4.39 1 .68 4.71 .98 .68
Hours .98 .85 .86 .72 .99 .68 .74 .97 .68
Productivity .64 .61 .66 .54 .99 .71 .55 .94 .7
M1 1.66 -.04 .77 6.62 -.28 .67 3.76 -.25 .68
Inflation .29 .01 .04 .17 .28 .67 .12 .19 .67
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coefficient
with output, and columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient.
Panel 1– Sample period:1981:Q1-2015:Q4 (140 observations), ρpi =.975 and νpi=.31.
Panel 2– Subsample period:1991:Q1-2015:Q4 (100 observations), ρpi =.929 and νpi=.5.
The Contribution of Nominal Capital Gain Tax I have performed another
Monte Carlo experiment setting the capital gain tax to zero. Disturbances are
generated by shocks to both the TFP and trend inflation. Some statistics sum-
marizing this experiment are reported in the second block of the top panel of
Table 6.5.
In the absence of capital gain tax, the model explains 81% of the fluctuations in
output. The share of the volatility in consumption, hours worked, and productivity
explained also dropped. The standard deviation of investment falls to get closer
to its actual value. On the other hand the volatility of nominal variables has
considerably increased: the volatility of inflation matches observations whereas
that of money far exceeds them. The correlation between hours and productivity
rose to .95.
The interaction of inflation and nominal capital gain tax has improved the
model’s ability to explain business cycle fluctuations, as it appears in the first
panel of Table 6.5. My next interest is to find out whether capital gain tax still
plays an important role when inflation becomes less persistent. In fact, over the
period 1991:Q1-2015:Q4, the persistence in trend inflation has fallen to .929 as a
result of the Bank of Canada’s commitment to keep inflation low (see Table 6.1). I
52 6 THE INFLATION AND TAX CODE MODEL
have simulated the model using this latter value and raising νπ to .5 to indicate the
more aggressive stance of the Bank of Canada against inflation. The results of the
Monte Carlo simulations are displayed in the bottom panel of Table 6.5. One can
observe that the introduction of capital gain tax has not much affected the cyclical
behavior of output, hours worked, and labor productivity. Only the volatility of
consumption and investment have increased but their percentage increases have
shrunk compared to the case where inflation persistence is higher. When persis-
tence in trend inflation drops from .975 to .929, the percentage increase in the
volatility of consumption after adding capital gain tax drops from 85% to 39%.
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis
Two main findings from the previous section are: adding nominal capital gain tax
raises the volatility of real variables and lowers their correlation with output. To
check the robustness of these results, I have performed several other Monte Carlo
experiments assigning different values to some key parameters, which are: the
monetary authority’s response to trend inflation, the persistence in trend inflation,
and the elasticity of substitution parameter.
The Monetary Authority’s Response to Trend Inflation Figure 6.2 shows
the evolution of some statistics summarizing the cyclical behavior of the economy
as the monetary authority’s aggressive stance against inflation intensifies, viz as
νπ increases. The lowest value νπ can assume in the absence of capital gain tax
is .27, otherwise the model has no solution.
It appears in the first two panels of Figure 6.2 that the volatility in consumption
and output decrease as νπ increases. The standard deviation of consumption
decreases faster in the absence of capital gain tax and that of output decreases
faster in the model with capital gain tax. On the other hand, an increase in
νπ raises the correlation between consumption and output. The impacts of the
changes in νπ on the summary statistics are small and do not affect the qualitative
results in the previous section.
The Persistence in Trend Inflation Figure 6.3 shows that the standard
deviation of consumption and output increase along with ρπ while the correlation
between the two variables decreases. These impacts are the opposite of those
occasioned by changes in νπ.
This sensitivity analysis reveals that low values of ρπ alter the qualitative
results of the previous section. Adding capital gain tax does not raise the standard
deviation of consumption when ρπ is equal to or less than .825. It does not either
raise the standard deviation of output when ρπ is lower than .9.
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Figure 6.2: Cyclical Behavior of Some Real Variables as a Function of the
Inflation Target Coefficient, the Inflation and Tax Code Model (e = .2 and
ρπ = .975)
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Figure 6.3: Cyclical Behavior of Some Real Variables as a Function of the
Inflation Trend Persistence Coefficient, the Inflation and Tax Code Model (e = .2
and νπ = .31)
54 7 THE STICKY PRICE MODEL
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1. Standard Deviation of Consumption
e
All Taxes
No Capital Gain Tax
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2.
0
2. Standard Deviation of Output
e
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
3. Correlation between Consumption & Output
e
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
4. Correlation between Productivity & Hours
e
Figure 6.4: Cyclical Behavior of Some Real Variables as a Function of the
Elasticity of Substitution Parameter, the Inflation and Tax Code Model
(νπ = .34 and ρπ = .975)
The Elasticity of Substitution Parameter It appears in the the third panel
of Figure 6.4, that values this parameter can reasonably assume range from 0 to
2. For e greater than 2, consumption in the model with capital gain tax becomes
countercyclical, which is counterfactual. It appears in the fourth panel of the
same figure that the model is capable of replicating the absence of correlation
between labor productivity and hours worked when e equals .44 or .45. For the
desired values of e, adding capital gain tax raises the volatility of consumption
and output and lowers their correlation. This prediction changes as e increases.
7 The Sticky Price Model
Four types of decision makers populate the economy: households, intermediate-
and final-good-producing firms, and the monetary authority. Households derive
utility from consuming the final good, holding money, and taking leisure time. The
intermediate-good-producing firms (henceforth, intermediate firms) operate within
a monopolistically competitive environment. Each of them supplies at a monopoly
price to the final sector a differentiated good, i.e. a good that is an imperfect
substitute for the others. The final good is a composite commodity produced by
perfectly competitive firms out of the intermediate goods. The monetary authority
sets the short-term nominal interest interest so as to minimize the volatility of
inflation and output.
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There are several variants of this model. What mostly distinguishes them
is the way the behavior of households or the prices of intermediate goods are
modeled. As far as the behavior of the prices of intermediate goods is concerned,
following Rotemberg (1982), some assume that all firms face a quadratic cost of
adjustment (Ireland, 1997, 2001, 2003; Dib, 2006). Others introduced nominal
rigidity following Taylor (1980) or Calvo (1983) assuming only a constant fraction
of firms charges a new price each period (Yun, 1996; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 2005; Amano, Ambler, and Rebei, 2007). Herein, I have followed the latter
approach.
7.1 The Households
Holding real money balances directly yields utility. The money-in-the-utility (MIU)
function is represented as follows
U
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
= at
[
Cet
e
+
χ1−ηt
η
(
Mt
Pt
)η]
+ υ ln(1− Lt), (7.1)
where the parameters e < 1 and η < 1 are the elasticity of substitution parameters.
The stochastic parameters at and χt, which denote respectively the preference and
money-demand shocks, follow an AR(1) process
ln at = ρa ln at−1 + ǫat, ǫat ∼ N
(
0, σ2a
)
(7.2a)
lnχt = ρχ lnχt−1 + (1− ρχ) lnχ+ ǫχt, ǫχt ∼ N
(
0, σ2χ
)
. (7.2b)
The representative household faces two constraints:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (7.3a)
Pt(Ct + It) +
φ
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)2
PtKt +Mt +
Bt
Rt
= Pt(wtLt + qtKt)
+Mt−1 +Bt−1 +Dt − Tt. (7.3b)
The first constraint is the law of motion of capital and the second one is the
nominal budget constraint. The household’s financial resources are made up of
labor and capital incomes, money balances carried from the previous period, one-
period bonds Bt−1, and dividends Dt earned from holding shares in intermediate
firms. Out of his incomes, he pays taxes Tt, purchases consumption and investment
goods, buy new bonds, and keeps some money. Bonds are risk-free assets that pay
the gross nominal interest rate Rt. Real rigidity occurs as it is costly to adjust
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capital stock inter-temporally. The third element on the lhs of (7.3b) is the capital
adjustment cost, where φ and κ are respectively the adjustment cost parameter
and the long-run gross growth rate of capital.
The four optimal conditions from maximizing (7.1) subject to (7.3) are:
υ
at
C1−et = wt(1− Lt) (7.4a)
χ1−ηt
(
Mt
Pt
)η−1
=
Rt − 1
Rt
Ce−1t (7.4b)
βEt
[
at+1
at
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e−1 Pt
Pt+1
]
Rt = 1 (7.4c)
βEt
{
at+1
at
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e−1 [
1 + qt+1 − δ + φ
(
Kt+2
Kt+1
− κ
)(
Kt+2
Kt+1
+
κ
2
)]}
=
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)
(7.4d)
Relation (7.4a) governs labor supply, (7.4b) is the demand for money, (7.4c) pre-
vents arbitrage opportunities, and (7.4d) governs the household’s investment de-
cision.
7.2 The Final Sector
It aggregates a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods Yt(i) into a final
good Yt according to the Dixit-Stiglitz technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, θ > 1, (7.5)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods.
The final firm rents its input at the monopoly price Pt(i) and sells its output at
the competitive price Pt. Its profit maximization problem is described as follows
max
Yt(i)
Pt
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di.
It results from this maximization problem that the inverse demand for each type
of intermediate good is
PtYt(i)
−θ
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] 1
θ−1
= Pt(i),
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hence the following demand
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
Yt. (7.6)
Thus, in addition to being the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods, the parameter θ also turns out to be the absolute value of the inverse of
the price-elasticity of demand for the intermediate goods.
Eliminating Yt(i) in (7.5) using (7.6), one gets after rearrangement the price
index expressed in terms of individual prices
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (7.7)
7.3 The Intermediate Firms
The production technology of each intermediate good is Cobb-Douglas and ex-
hibits constant returns to scale.
Yt(i) = Kt(i)
α [ztLt(i)]
1−α , 0 < α < 1 (7.8)
Relation (4.5) describes the law of motion of zt, the TFP.
The intermediate firms are monopolistically competitive. They pay their share-
holders a dividend Dt after remunerating the capital and labor inputs. They there-
fore face a two-stage optimization problem, which consists of: (1) minimizing their
total cost of producing a given level of output and (2) maximizing the dividend.
The total cost minimization problem
TC∗[Yt(i)] = min
Kt(i),Lt(i)
qtKt(i) + wtLt(i)− ϕt
{
Kt(i)
α [ztLt(i)]
1−α − Yt(i)
}
,
has as FOCs
qt = ϕtα
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
(7.9a)
wt = ϕt(1− α)Yt(i)
Lt(i)
. (7.9b)
Taking the derivative of TC∗ with respect to Yt(i) shows that the Lagrange mul-
tiplier ϕt is also the marginal cost.
The nominal dividend firm i pays is
Dt(i) =
{
Pt(i)− PtTC
∗[Yt(i)]
Yt(i)
}
Yt(i)
= [Pt(i)− Ptϕt]Yt(i),
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where the second line follows from the fact that average cost equals marginal cost
when total cost is minimized. There is a probability ̟j that a firm keeps its
price unchanged between time t and t + j, for 0 ≤ j < ∞, which will affect the
discounted sum of its real dividends
Et
∞∑
j=0
̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt(i)
Pt+j
− ϕt+j
)
Yt+j(i)
where µt = atC
e−1
t is the marginal utility of consumption and the expression
βjµt+j/µt is referred to as stochastic discount factor. Given (7.6) the dividend
maximization problem of a firm reseting its price at time t can be written as follows
min
Pt(i)
Et
∞∑
j=0
̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt(i)
Pt+j
− ϕt+j
)[
Pt(i)
Pt+j
]−θ
Yt+j
with as as FOC for the optimal choice of Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
j=0
̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
[
(1− θ)P
∗
t (i)
Pt+j
+ θϕt+j
] [
P ∗t (i)
Pt+j
]−θ Yt+j
P ∗t (i)
= 0,
which one solves to get
P ∗t (i)
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ
Yt+jϕt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ−1
Yt+j
. (7.10)
The are several ways of modeling the probability ̟j, which include: (1) the
Calvo (1983) pricing scheme where ̟j = ̟
j for 0 ≤ j < ∞, (2) the truncated
Calvo pricing where ̟j = ̟
j for 0 ≤ j < J and ̟j = 0 for j ≥ J , and (3) the
Taylor (1980) pricing where ̟j = 1 for 0 ≤ j < J and ̟j = 0 for j ≥ J (Amano,
Ambler, and Rebei, 2007). While under Calvo pricing, a firm can permanently
keep its price unchanged, the truncated Calvo scheme restricts this possibility to
J periods at most. Under Taylor pricing, each firm has to keep its price unchanged
for exactly J periods.
To maintain tractability, I assume Calvo pricing. If 1 − ̟ is the probability
that a price change occur, it also designates the average number of adjusting firms
per time unit; the total number of intermediate firms being normalized to unity.
It follows that the average length of time between price changes is 1/(1−̟). 12
12This result is the basis of the relationship between two statistical distributions: the Poisson
distribution which describes the number of occurrences per time interval, and the exponential
distribution,which describes the time interval between occurrences.
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7.4 The Monetary Authority
Its policy rule is a generalization of the Taylor (1993) rule to allow for interest
rate smoothing. Smoothing interest rate is to let it depend on its history. The
monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate not only in response
to its past decision but also to the deviation of both inflation and output from
their targets
ln
Rt
R
= νr ln
Rt−1
R
+ νπ ln
πt
π
+ νy ln
Yt
Y
+ ξt, ξt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ
)
. (7.11)
For nominal interest rate to be stationary, it is required −1 < νr < 1. The
Taylor principle requires the nominal interest rate respond more than one for one
to changes in inflation (νπ > 1). The monetary authority chooses its response
coefficients νr, νπ, and νy to minimize a weighted sum of the variance of inflation
and output
min
νr ,νpi,νy
(πt − π)2 + Λy(Yt − Y )2. (7.12)
Money demand then adjusts to the target nominal interest rate and lump-sum
taxes are used to issue new money.
Mt =Mt−1 + Tt (7.13)
7.5 The General Equilibrium
All intermediate firms are endowed with the same production technology, face
identical iso-elastic demand curves, and have the same marginal cost. As a conse-
quence, the firms re-optimizing their dividends at time t will all choose the same
price, i.e. P ∗t (i) = P
∗
t . The average price of the other firms will be the one that
prevailed at time t− 1, i.e. Pt−1. Relation (7.7) can therefore be broken down as
follows
Pt =
[∫ ̟
0
P 1−θt−1 di+
∫ 1
̟
P ∗t
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
,
which one rearranges to get
P 1−θt = ̟P
1−θ
t−1 + (1−̟)P ∗t 1−θ. (7.14)
Relation (7.14) shows the effect of inertia in price adjustment. A high ̟ means a
high inertia, i.e. many firms are not adjusting their prices. In that case, the past
average price helps predicts the current one.
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One gets the aggregate supply, Y st , integrating over (7.6), the conditional de-
mand function.
Y st =
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di
= YtSt (7.15a)
St =
∫ 1
0
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
di (7.15b)
Yt = Ct + It +
φ
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)2
Kt (7.15c)
Y st = K
α
t (ztLt)
1−α , (7.15d)
where St measures price dispersion across firms. Because of the price dispersion,
intermediate firms do not all produce the same amount of output. As a conse-
quence, aggregate supply deviates from its long-run level Yt. The price dispersion
can be expressed recursively breaking down (7.15b) into two
St =
∫ ̟
0
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1
Pt−1
Pt
]−θ
di+
∫ 1
̟
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−θ
di
= πθt
∫ ̟
0
[
Pt−1(i)
Pt−1
]−θ
di+ (1−̟)p∗t−θ
= ̟πθtSt−1 + (1−̟)p∗t−θ, (7.16)
where p∗t = P
∗
t /Pt. The lag of St in (7.16) follows from the fact the price dispersion
across firms that are not re-optimizing their dividends at time t equals the price
dispersion that prevailed across all firms at time t− 1.
For convenience reasons, the price adjustment equation (7.10) is written as
system of three equations using the artificial variables X1t and X2t
1 =
θ
θ − 1
X1t
X2t
(7.17a)
X1t = ̟βEtπ
θ
t+1
µt+1
µt
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−1−θ
X1,t+1 + p
∗ −1−θ
t Ytϕt (7.17b)
X2t = ̟βEtπ
θ−1
t+1
µt+1
µt
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−θ
X2,t+1 + p
∗ −θ
t Yt, (7.17c)
where πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt (for more details, see Appendix B.1). An alternative to
the above system of equations would be to approximate both (7.10) and (7.14)
around the BGP to derive what is called the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. But
this exercise is complicated by the fact that trend inflation occurs as prices grow
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at the gross rate π > 1 along the BGP. In Appendix B.2, I have derived one for
the case π = 1.
The DSGE model consists of a set of prices {(Pt, P ∗t , qt, Rt, wt)}∞t=0, a state
of the world {(at, zt, χt)}∞t=0, an allocation {(Ct, It, Lst ,Kst ,Mdt )}∞t=0 for the rep-
resentative household, an allocation {(Yt, St)}∞t=0 for final firms, an allocation{
(Kdt , L
d
t ,X1t,X2t, Y
s
t , ϕt)
}∞
t=0
for intermediate firms, and an allocation {(M st )}∞t=0
for the monetary authority such that:
i. {(Ct, It, Lst ,Kst ,Mdt )}∞t=0 solves relations (7.3a) and (7.4a)-(7.4d),
ii. {(Yt, St)}∞t=0 solves relations (7.15a) and (7.16),
iii.
{
(Kdt , L
d
t ,X1t,X2t, Y
s
t , ϕt)
}∞
t=0
solves relations (7.9a)-(7.9b), (7.15d), and (7.17a)-
(7.17c),
iv. {(at, zt, χt)}∞t=0 is governed by relations (4.5) and (7.2a)-(7.2b),
v. capital and labor markets clear, i.e. Kdt = K
s
t and L
d
t = L
s
t , equilibrium in
the final good market is described by (7.15c), (7.11) ensures the money market
clears, i.e. Mdt =M
s
t , and (7.14) describes prices. .
The share of time allocated to labor is a stationary variable. So is the marginal
cost. Relation (7.9b) thus constrains real output and wage to grow at the same
rate. Relation (7.4a) constrains this rate to be zero, for e 6= 0. As a consequence,
all the other real variables and the nominal interest rate are also stationary. It
follows that the long-run gross growth rate of the TFP, γz, and the long-run gross
growth rate of physical capital, κ, are equal to one. Money consequently grows at
the same rate as prices.
7.6 Calibration
The capital share, α, and depreciation rate δ from the earlier calibration exercise
are respectively .329 and .015. The gross rate of inflation π is 1.007 (Table 4.1).
The Probability of Price Inertia The OLS estimate of the degree of price
stickiness (or rate-of-change parameter) in Table 3.4 is .56. This means 56% of
the growth in nominal demand is incorporated into prices and 44% results in
changes in real output. The probability that a firm keeps its price unchanged, ̟
is therefore set to .44.
The Stochastic Process of the Preference and Money Demand Shocks
Log-linearizing households’ labor supply and money demand equations, respec-
tively relations (7.4a) and (7.4b), gives
lnCt = − ln γ
1− e +
lnwt
1− e +
ln at
1− e (7.18a)
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Table 7.1: OLS Estimates of the Stochastic Process Followed by the Preference
and Money Demand Shocks
Dependent Variable ln at lnχt
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Intercept -.001 -1.36 .0004 -.742 .23
Lag Dependent Variable .908 48.28 .949 34.5
R¯2 .944 .896
Residual Standard Error .008 .021
t2.5%(137) = 1.977
ln
Mt
Pt
≈ ln(Rt − 1)
η − 1 +
e− 1
η − 1 lnCt + lnχt, (7.18b)
where Rt−1, the first variable on the rhs of (7.18b), is a first-order approximation
of (Rt − 1)/Rt around 1. The natural logarithm of the preference shock, at, and
the money demand shock, χt, are the residuals of the above two econometric
models. The parameters of the AR(1) process followed by the preference and
money demand shocks estimated using the OLS residuals are reported in Table 7.1.
The OLS estimate of 1/(η − 1), the interest elasticity of money demand, in
model (7.18b) is -.044. It follows that η equals -21.63.
The Other Parameters Evaluating the price adjustment equation along the
BGP gives
p∗ =
θ
θ − 1
1−̟βπθ−1
1−̟βπθ ϕ.
According Statistics Canada’s annual retail trade survey, the gross profit margin
averaged 26.8% over the period 2012-2015. The parameters β and θ are set so
that (p⋆ − ϕ)/p⋆ = .268 and investment-output ratio equals .16 as observed.
The leisure weight, υ, depends on the value assigned to the elasticity of substi-
tution parameter e. This latter parameter is set to .3, which ensures the simulated
correlation between cyclical consumption and output is close to observations. The
capital adjustment coefficient, φ, which is a free parameter, is set to 2, which
ensures the simulated volatility of investment is also close to observations. The
values of the parameters νr, νy, and νπ that minimize the quadratic loss func-
tion (7.12) given the constraints 0 ≤ νr < 1 and 1 < νπ < 2 are returned by the
Dynare command osr, which stands for optimal simple rule. They are reported in
Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: The Baseline Parameters of the Sticky Price Model
Households e Inter-temporal elasticity of consumption parameter .3
β Discount factor .993
η Interest elasticity of money demand parameter –21.629
κ Capital long-run gross growth rate 1
ρa Preference shock persistence parameter .908
ρχ Money demand shock persistence parameter .949
σa Preference shock standard deviation .008
σχ Money demand shock standard deviation .021
υ Leisure weight 1.312
φ Capital adjustment cost parameter 2
Firms α Capital share .329
γp Inflation rate 1.007
δ Depreciation rate .015
θ Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 3.787
̟ Probability of price inertia .44
ρz Persistence parameter of TFP .95
σz Standard deviation of TFP shock .009
Government Λy Weight of output gap in the loss function 1.5
νr Response to change in interest rate .9
νy Response to change in output .227
νpi Response to change in inflation 1.9
σξ Standard deviation of interest rate shock .017
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Table 7.3: Steady State and Average Values Associated with Different Values of
Trend Inflation, the Sticky Price Model
π=1 π=1.007 π=1.057
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel 1 ( ̟ = .44)
Output .9591 .9573 .9590 .9572 .9398 ..9376
Consumption .8037 .8022 .8036 .8020 .7874 .7855
Investment .1554 .1552 .1554 .1551 .1524 .1521
Hours .2961 .2959 .2961 .2959 .2950 .2948
Wage 1.5995 1.5974 1.5993 1.5972 1.5744 1.5716
M1 .5508 .5729 .5353 .5553 .5010 .5234
Welfare 2.6606 2.6601 2.6403
Welfare Costs: 100 × ∆C˜
C
0 .0585 2.1651
100× ∆C˜
Y˜
0 .0490 1.8143
Panel 2 ( ̟ = .66)
Output .9591 .9568 .9587 .9561 .8480
Consumption .8037 .8016 .8033 .8010 .7096
Investment .1554 .1551 .1554 .1551 .1384
Hours .2961 .2958 .2961 .2958 .2901
Wage 1.5995 1.5966 1.5990 1.5958 1.4537
M1 .5508 .5759 .5353 .5587 .4994
Welfare 2.6607 2.6597 2.5538
Welfare Costs: 100 × ∆C˜
C
0 .1053 10.9058
100× ∆C˜
Y˜
0 .0882 9.1387
Columns (1) Steady state value, columns (2) Average value of the simulated series
7.7 The Welfare Cost of Inflation
Table 7.3 shows the impacts of trend inflation on both the model’s steady state
and stochastic means, i.e. the average value of the simulated series. To solve
numerically the model and simulate it, its second-order approximation around the
steady state is taken. Taking the second-order approximation instead of the first-
order one enables capturing the impacts of the shocks on the stochastic means.
Trend inflation lowers the steady state value of output, consumption, invest-
ment, hours worked and wage (Panel 1 of Table 7.3). A .7% quarterly trend
inflation lowers the steady state output and consumption by about .01%. As a
result, households’ welfare decreases. One computes the welfare cost of inflation
solving (7.19): To compensate households for the welfare loss caused by a .7%
trend inflation, one has to increase their steady state consumption by about .06%.
U
(
C,
M
P
,L
) ∣∣
π=1
= U
(
C∗ +∆C,
M∗
P ∗
, L∗
) ∣∣
π={1.007,1.057}
, (7.19)
Trend inflation lowers intermediate firms’ real marginal cost as real wage has
fallen and capital rental price has remained unchanged. It also creates a price
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Figure 7.1: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock,
Deviation form Steady State, the Sticky Price Model
dispersion across firms as those re-optimizing their dividends see an opportunity
to charge a higher price.
It appears in Table 7.3 that the welfare cost is an increasing function of inflation
rate. It also depends on other parameters such as: the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption, the elasticity of substitution between durables, and
the degree of price stickiness. The second panel of Table 7.3 shows that when the
probability of price inertia doubles, a .7% trend inflation lowers the steady state
output and consumption by .05%, which is 4 times higher.
Table 7.3 also shows the impacts of trend inflation on the spread, i.e. the dif-
ference, between the steady state values and the stochastic means. In the absence
of inflation, the steady state value of output and consumption were higher than
their stochastic means by .19%. This spread monotonically increases along with
trend inflation. Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007) attribute this to an increase in
price dispersion across firms. The second panel of Table 7.3, I show that the spread
between the steady state values and the stochastic means also increases along with
the probability of price inertia. The fact is that, as it appears in relation (7.16),
price dispersion becomes more persistent as ̟ increases.
7.8 The Impulse Responses
Figure 7.1 plots the response of the model to an expansionary monetary policy
shock. The dotted and dashed lines are the responses respectively when the prob-
ability of price inertia is 50% higher and trend inflation is 5% higher.
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Figure 7.2: Impulse Responses to a Preference Shock, Deviation form Steady
State, the Sticky Price Model
This shock that lowers the nominal interest rate (Panel 5) and raises money
(Panel 4) stimulates the economy by encouraging consumption (Panel 1) and in-
vestment (Panel 2). Output, hours worked, and wage rise, as a consequence. These
impacts contrast with those of the inflation and tax code model (Figure 6.1) where
consumption and wage fall after an expansionary monetary policy shock. Besides,
the impacts of the monetary policy shock in the sticky price model fade out very
quickly compared to the inflation and tax code model. The impact on consump-
tion lasts longer when the probability of price inertia is 50% higher. Besides, the
immediate response of the real variables is stronger when price inertia or trend
inflation is higher.
Figure 7.2 shows the responses to a preference shock. The dotted and dashed
lines respectively correspond to the cases where the elasticity of substitution be-
tween durables is 50% higher and trend inflation is 5% higher. The response to
this shock takes longer to fade out. A positive preference shock lowers the nomi-
nal interest rate, which causes households to prefer consumption over investment
and leisure. Real wage rises as the result of the increase in hours worked. Con-
sumption further increases and investment further decreases when the elasticity
of substitution between durables is 50% higher.
7.9 The Cyclical Properties
I have performed some Monte Carlo simulations to check the model’s ability to
mimic the cyclical behavior of the Canadian economy. These experiments have
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Table 7.4: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian and the Sticky Price Economies,
Percentage Deviation from Trend of Key Variables
Canadian Economy
Sticky Price Economy
Only Technology Shock All Shocks
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel 1 (Sticky Price: ̟ = .44)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 .97 1 .73 1.3 1 .44
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .73 1 .71 1.1 .82 .66
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 2.23 1 .75 4.71 .72 .20
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 .31 .99 .80 1.36 .81 .13
Productivity .68 .42 .62 .64 1 .73 .90 .86 .35
M1 4.4 .4 .92 .57 .60 .87 2.94 .23 .68
Interest Rate 1.35 .56 .75 .14 -1 .72 .16 -.96 .50
Inflation .28 .11 .12 .15 -.96 .51 .74 .41 -.02
Panel 2 (Flexible Price: ̟ = 0)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 .99 1 .70 1.07 1 .69
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .74 1 .78 1.08 .91 .68
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 2.33 1 .70 2.79 .54 .67
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 .34 .99 .70 .69 .79 .67
Productivity .68 .42 .62 .66 1 .70 .68 .78 .68
Interest Rate 1.35 .56 .75 .14 -1 .70 .14 -.95 .69
M1 4.4 .4 .92 .57 -.61 .86 2.95 .12 .70
Inflation .28 .11 .12 .15 -.95 .47 .88 -.18 -.66
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coefficient
with output, and columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient.
two purposes: (1) to check whether monetary disturbances are instrumental in
business cycle fluctuations and (2) if so, to check whether the non-neutrality of
money stems from nominal price rigidity. The summary statistics from these
experiments are reported in the second and third blocks of Table 7.4.
It appears in Panel 1, that, with only technology shock, the sticky price model
explains 62% of the fluctuations in output and less than half of those in investment.
It explains respectively 22% and 13% of the volatility in hours worked and money.
Adding monetary policy and the two other shocks, the share of the volatility of
output explained rose from 62% to 83%. The model now explains almost all
the fluctuations in consumption, investment, and hours worked. The simulated
correlation of these variables with output become close to observations. While the
standard deviation of money has risen to get close to the observed one, productivity
and inflation has become too much volatile. Monetary policy shock contributed
most to improving the volatility of output, investment, and hours worked while
preference shocks contributed most to improving the volatility of consumption and
money. When the monetary policy shock was added, the volatility of output rose
by 28%, that of investment doubles, and that of hours worked quadruples
In Panel 2 of Table 7.4, the probability of price inertia, ̟, is set to zero, which
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Figure 7.3: Standard Deviations as a Function of of the Monetary Authority’s
Response to Output Gap, the Sticky Price Model
means prices are flexible. When prices are flexible, monetary policy shock does
not add much to the cyclical behavior of the model. Only the cyclical behavior
of nominal variables and their correlation with output are affected. Most of the
difference between the second and third blocks are brought by the preferences
shocks.
These experiments show that the model needs the assumption of price sticki-
ness to explain the cyclical behavior of the Canadian economy. Monetary policy
shocks do not propagate into the real economy in the absence of price stickiness.
Ireland (2003) came up up with the same conclusion after estimating by maximum
likelihood a DSGEmodel in which price stickiness is modeled following Rotemberg.
The value of the monetary authority’s response to output gap, νy depends on
the weight of output, Λy in the objective function (7.12). The other parameters νr
and νπ are insensitive to Λy because of the constraints placed (0 ≤ νr < 1, 1 < νπ <
2). I have therefore undertaken several other Monte Carlo simulations in order
to check the sensitivity to νy of the role of price stickiness in the propagation of
monetary policy shock. Figure 7.3 and 7.4 plot the simulated standard deviations
and correlation coefficients with output of some key variables as a function of νy.
When prices are flexible, changes in νy do not much impact on the standard
deviation of investment, hours worked, output, real wage, and the rental price of
capital. On the other hand, when prices are sticky, the standard deviation of these
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Figure 7.4: Correlation Coefficients with Output as a Function of of the
Monetary Authority’s Response to Output Gap, the Sticky Price Model
variables decreases as νy increases but the model keeps generating more volatility
than when prices are flexible, except for consumption.
When prices are sticky, consumption and money become more pro-cyclical as
νy increases. They other variables become less pro-cyclical. The nominal interest
rate is pro-cyclical only when νy is negative.
Finally, Figures 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that changes in the monetary policy rule,
especially the strength of the monetary authority’s response to output deviation
to its target, can explain the break in the cyclical behavior of real and nominal
variables observed after 1991.
8 The Financial Accelerator Model
Credit market conditions play a central role in the propagation of business cycles.
Their deterioration, i.e. sharp increases in insolvencies and bankruptcies, rising
real debt burdens, collapsing asset prices, and bank failures, depress the economic
activity. The Great Recession, for instance, was caused by the bursting of the
global housing bubble and the subprime mortgage crisis that followed in 2007-08.
The fact that endogenous developments in the credit markets work to propa-
gate and amplify real and monetary shocks to the economy is referred to as the
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financial accelerator effect. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) incorporate
this effect into the new-Keynesian framework to illustrate how credit market im-
perfections (frictions) influence the transmission of the monetary policy.
The model is made up of five agents: households, retailers, entrepreneurs,
financial intermediaries, and the monetary authority. The financial intermediaries
lend funds received from households to entrepreneurs.
8.1 The Household
Their preferences are defined over consumption, real money balances, and leisure
U
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
=
at
e
ln
[
Cet + χ
1−e
t
(
Mt
Pt
)e]
+ υ ln(1− Lt). (8.1)
The laws of motion of at, the preference shock, and χt, the money demand shock,
are described by (7.2). The budget constraint is similar to (7.3b) except the fact
households do not hold any physical capital stock. They instead entrust their
savings to financial intermediaries in return of a real risk-free gross interest rate
Rt.
PtCt + PtBt+1 +Mt = PtwtLt +RtPtBt +Dt+1 +Mt−1 − Tt, (8.2)
where Bt denotes households’ real savings.
The FOCs and Euler equation from maximizing (8.1) subject to (8.2) are:
υ
at
C1−et
[
Cet + χ
1−e
t
(
Mt
Pt
)e]
= wt(1− Lt) (8.3a)
χ1−et
(
Mt
Pt
)e−1
=
Rt+1 − 1
Rt+1
Ce−1t (8.3b)
βEt

at+1
at
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e−1 Cet + χ1−et (MtPt
)e
Cet+1 + χ
1−e
t+1
(
Mt+1
Pt+1
)eRt+1

 = 1. (8.3c)
Comparing the optimal conditions in (8.3) to those in (7.4) shows that the loga-
rithmic transformation of a MIU only affects the intra-temporal trade-off between
consumption and leisure and the inter-temporal substitution of consumption for
investment. The money demand equation remains unchanged provided the interest
elasticity of money demand is still the same.
8.2 The Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs are finitely-lived. There is a probability ̟e that they survive
to the next period. Their expected lifespan is therefore 1/(1−̟e) as explained in
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Footnote 12. They are risk-neutral and produce a wholesale good using labor and
capital. They purchase the capital stock out of their internal funds and borrowings
from financial intermediaries. They therefore face a profit maximization and a loan
contracting problems.
The Profit Maximization Problem Entrepreneurs are perfectly competitive.
They operate a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology using physical
capital and labor as inputs. They produce themselves the capital stock. On the
other hand, labor is a composite of households’ labor L and entrepreneurs’ labor
Le.
Entrepreneurs produce the capital goods using the final good purchased from
retailers. An aggregate real investment expenditure of It on the final good yields
xtIt new capital goods. Capital therefore evolves as follows
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + exp(xt)It, (8.4)
where the stochastic parameter xt denotes the investment-specific technological
change (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman, 1988; Fisher, 2006). It follows a
stationary autoregressive process of order 1
xt = ρxxt−1 + ǫxt ǫxt ∼ N
(
0, σ2x
)
. (8.5)
Entrepreneurs undergo adjustment costs while converting the final good into cap-
ital good. Following Christensen and Dib (2008), I assume these adjustment costs
are quadratic. Given Pkt, the relative cost of a unit of capital, entrepreneurs
choose It to maximize their gain
max
It
Pkt exp(xt)It − It − φ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt,
which they achieve when
Pkt = exp(−xt)
[
1 + φ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)]
. (8.6)
The aggregate production of the wholesale good by entrepreneurs is
Yt = K
α
t
(
ztL
ζ
tL
1−ζ
et
)1−α
, 0 < α, ζ < 1, (8.7)
where ζ denotes the share of households’ labor in the wage bill. The wholesale
good, is sold at the price Pwt to retailers. Household and entrepreneurial labor are
remunerated respectively at the real rates wt and wet. As for the return on capital,
it varies across entrepreneurs. Holding a unit of capital yields the entrepreneur j
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the gross return νjtRkt, where νjt denotes its idiosyncratic or residual component.
Assuming E (νjt) = 1, the aggregate gross return on capital is Rkt.
The entrepreneurs choose Kt+1, Lt, and Let to maximize their profits
max
Kt+1,Lt,Let
Pwt
Pt
Kαt
(
ztL
ζ
tL
1−ζ
et
)1−α − (Rkt − 1)Pk,t−1Kt − wtLt − wet, Let, (8.8)
subject to (8.4).
This program has as FOCs
Et
[
α
ϕt+1
Pkt
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ)Pk,t+1
Pkt
]
= Et (Rk,t+1) (8.9a)
ϕt(1− α)ζ Yt
Lt
= wt (8.9b)
ϕt(1− α)(1 − ζ) Yt
Let
= wet, (8.9c)
where ϕt = Pwt/Pt is the relative price of the wholesale good. Relation (8.9a), the
user cost of capital, is obtained solving inter-temporally the above maximization
program. Comparing (8.9) to (7.9) shows the relative price of the wholesale good
is also its real marginal cost.
The Contracting Problem To purchase new capital goods, the entrepreneurs
use both their net worth and borrowing from financial intermediaries. The net
worth of entrepreneurs or their internal funds is made up of their labor income
and the unconsumed portion of the wealth they accumulated by operating firms.
Each entrepreneur’s’ agreement with his financial intermediary is to reimburse
him out of the gross return on capital. Thus, entrepreneur j holding Kj,t+1 units
of capital pays back ν¯tRk,t+1Pk,tKj,t+1 out of his gross return νjtRk,t+1Pk,tKj,t+1,
provided ν¯t ≤ νjt. He then keeps the difference as equity. In case of default, i.e.
when ν¯t > νjt, the financial intermediary cashes all the gross return on capital. To
be able to observe νjt, the financial intermediary pays a auditing cost 0 < A < 1.
The optimal contracting problem consists in maximizing the entrepreneurial
equity subject to the expected return of the financial intermediary. The aggregate
entrepreneurial equity equals
Vt+1 = E
{∫ ∞
ν¯t
νdF (ν)− [1− F (ν¯t)] ν¯t
}
Rk,t+1PktKt+1 (8.10)
where F (ν) is the probability distribution of the idiosyncratic component of the
return on capital. Thus, F (ν¯) denotes the probability of default.
Entrepreneurs who give up on their business consume their equity
Cet = (1−̟e)Vt. (8.11)
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Those who survive to the next period reinvest their equity. The net worth of the
entrepreneurs is therefore
Nt+1 = ̟eVt + wet, (8.12)
which is the sum of the equity from investment made at period t− 1 by surviving
entrepreneurs and the income received from allocating inelastically one unit of
labor to running business at time t. A share ̟e of the labor income wet comes
from entrepreneurs who survive from t− 1 to t. The remaining share is a transfer
from entrepreneurs who quit their business to startups.
The amount borrowed from the financial intermediaries is therefore PktKt+1−
Nt+1. Given the two states of nature, which are default or non-default, the re-
payment the financial intermediaries expect from the entrepreneurs is equal to the
opportunity cost of lending, which is the real risk-free interest rate{
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯t
0
νdF (ν)
}
Rk,t+1Pk,tKt+1 = Rt+1×
(PktKt+1 −Nt+1) . (8.13)
It emerges from maximizing (8.10) subject to (8.13) that
E(Rk,t+1) = s
(
Nt+1
PktKt+1
)
Rt+1, (8.14)
where the function s is decreasing in Nt+1/PktKt+1, which measures the financial
condition of entrepreneurs. Details on this optimization problem are provided in
Appendix A.6. Relation (8.14), which is the supply curve for investment finance,
shows that the premium on external funds, i.e. the ratio of the return on capital
and the risk-free interest rate, is inversely related to the percentage equity holding
of entrepreneurs. A low percentage equity holding worsens credit market frictions
raising the premium on external funds. As for the demand for new capital, it is ob-
tained by substituting the aggregate production and the price of capital relations,
respectively (8.7) and (8.6), into the user cost of capital (8.9a).
Regarding the financial condition of entrepreneurs, changes over time in their
net worth can be described endogenously by a difference equation. To get this,
first, one substitutes (8.13), the financial intermediaries’ expected income, into
(8.10), the entrepreneurs’ equity, which gives
Vt = −
(
Rt +
A ∫ ν¯t0 νdF (ν)RktPk,t−1Kt
Pt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Pk,t−1Kt −Nt)
+RktPk,t−1Kt. (8.15)
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Then, plugging (8.15) and (8.9c), the entrepreneurs’ aggregate productivity, into
(8.12), their net worth, one has after rearrangement
Nt+1 = ϕt(1− α)(1 − ζ)Kαt
(
ztL
ζ
t
)1−α
+
̟e
[
RktPk,t−1Kt −
(
Rt +
A ∫ ν¯t0 νdF (ν)RktPk,t−1Kt
Pt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Pk,t−1Kt −Nt)
]
. (8.16)
Note that in (8.16), both Pwt, the price of the wholesale good, and Let, the en-
trepreneurial labor, have been set to unity. The financial accelerator operates
through relations (8.14) and (8.16).
The natural logarithm of ν follows a normal distribution. This allows to write
the expectation
∫ ν¯t
0 νdF (ν) in (8.16) as a cumulative distribution.∫ ν¯t
0
νdF (ν) =
∫ ln(ν¯t)
−∞
ν
σ
√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(
ln(ν)− µ
σ
)2]
d ln(ν),
which becomes, after writing ν as exp[ln(ν)]∫ ln(ν¯t)
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(
ln(ν)− µ
σ
)2
+ ln(ν)
]
d ln(ν).
Performing a change of variable by defining V = ln(ν)− µ, one gets
exp(µ)
∫ V¯t+µ
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
−1
2
V2 − 2Vσ2
σ2
)
dV,
which becomes after completing the square,
exp(µ+
σ2
2
)
∫ V¯t+µ
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(V − σ2
σ
)2]
dV.
This establishes that when ν is log-normally distributed,∫ ν¯t
0
νdF (ν) = exp(µ+
σ2
2
)F [ln(ν¯t)] .
Given the expected value of ν, i.e.
∫∞
−∞ νdF (ν), equals one, the following restric-
tion should be placed on the first term on the rhs of the above relation: µ = −σ2/2.
It follows that ∫ ν¯t
0
νdF (ν) = F [ln(ν¯t)]
= Φ
(
ln(ν¯t)− σ2/2
σ
)
.
The cutoff ν¯t is held constant over time, i.e. ν¯t = ν¯.
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8.3 The Retailers
They operate in a monopolistically competitive environment to produce each a
differentiated good Yt(i) that is aggregated into a composite final good Y
s
t . The
demand for the differentiated good to produce the final good is described by (7.6).
The price of the final good, Pt, in terms of the differentiated goods is described
by (7.7). Given there is a probability ̟ that retailers keep their prices, Pt(i),
unchanged, Pt can be written as a weighted average of the price of non-adjusting
and adjusting firms as in (7.14). The price of non-adjusting retailers is the aver-
age price that prevailed last period, Pt−1, and the price of adjusting retailers is
described by (7.10).
8.4 The Monetary authority
The monetary policy rule is
ln
Rnt
R
= νr ln
Rn,t−1
R
+ νπ ln
πt
π
+ νy ln
Yt
Y
+ ξt, ξt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ
)
(8.17a)
Rn,t+1 = Et
(
Rt+1
Pt+1
Pt
)
, (8.17b)
where Rnt denotes the nominal interest rate. The monetary authority’s objective
is described by (7.12).
8.5 The General Equilibrium
Assuming prices ares are stationary, the first-order Taylor series approximation of
(7.10) and (7.14) gives the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (see details in Appendix
B.2)
πˆt =
(1−̟)(1−̟β)
̟
ϕˆt + βEtπˆt+1, (8.18)
where πˆt and ϕˆt are the respective percentage deviations of πt and ϕt from steady
state.
According to the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, inflation is forward-looking
and driven by firms’ marginal cost. The traditional Phillips curve, as in model
(3.9), describes inflation as a backward-looking variable that instead depends on
output gap or unemployment rate.
The DSGE model consists of a set of prices {(Pt, P ∗t , Pkt, Rt, Rkt, wt)}∞t=0, a
state of the world {(at, xt, zt, χt)}∞t=0, an allocation {(Ct, Lst ,Mdt )}∞t=0 for the rep-
resentative household, an allocation
{
(Bt, Cet, It,Kt, L
d
t , Nt, Vt, Yt), ϕt)
}∞
t=0
for en-
trepreneurs, an allocation {(St, Y st )}∞t=0 for retailers, and an allocation {(M st )}∞t=0
for the monetary authority such that:
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i. {(Ct, Lst ,Mdt )}∞t=0 solves relations (8.3a)-(8.3c),
ii.
{
(Bt, Cet, It,Kt, L
d
t , Nt, Vt, Yt, ϕt)
}∞
t=0
solves relations (8.4), (8.6), (8.7), (8.9a)-
(8.9b), (8.11), (8.14), (8.15), and (8.16) ,
iii. {(St, Y st )}∞t=0 solves relations (7.15a) and (7.16),
iv. {(at, xt, zt, χt)}∞t=0 is governed by relations (4.5), (7.2a)-(7.2b), and (8.5),
v. capital and labor markets clear, i.e. Bt = Pk,t−1Kt − Nt and Ldt = Lst ,
equilibrium in the final good market is described by Yt = Ct + Cet + It +
AΦ
(
ln(ν¯)−σ2/2
σ
)
RktPk,t−1Kt, relations (8.17a) and (8.17b) ensure the money
market clears, i.e. Mdt = M
s
t , and relations (7.14) and (8.18) describe the
evolution of prices.
8.6 Calibration
The values assigned to the parameters α, β, δ, ̟, ρa, ρz, ρχ, σa, σz, and σχ are
the same as those used in Section 7 (see Table 7.2). The value of the interest
elasticity of money demand from the previous section, -21.629, is assigned to e. I
assume ζ, households’ share of labor income, is 99%.
Relation (8.14) is linearized to avoid deriving the functional form of s from a
probability distribution, which gives
E
(
Rˆk,t+1
)
− Rˆt+1 = νs
(
Pˆkt + Kˆt+1 − Nˆt+1
)
, (8.19)
where the hat over the variables Kt+1, Nt+1, Pkt, Rt+1, Rk,t+1 refers to their
percentage deviations from steady state. The parameter νs ≥ 0, the elasticity of
the external finance premium with respect to the percentage equity holding, is
defined as follows
νs = −
d ln s
(
Nt+1
PktKt+1
)
d ln Nt+1PktKt+1
=
d ln
Rk,t+1
Rt+1
d lnψ
(
Rk,t+1
Rt+1
) .
The parameter νs only appears in (8.19). It does not affect the steady state
position of the economy given all the variables in this relation are expressed as
percentage deviation. Its value will be set while simulating the model doing a
sensitivity analysis.
According to Statistics Canada’s data on firms’ quarterly balance sheets, the
ratio of the capital share and the capital assets averages .659 over the period
1988-2015. I have assigned this value to the percentage equity holding N/PkK.
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I have set
∫ ν¯
0 νdF (ν), the expected value of the idiosyncratic risk among default
firms, to .01. I have set the auditing cost, A, to .12 as Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist did. The values of ̟e and υ that result from the calibration exercise are
respectively .994 and 1.468.
The investment-specific technological change parameter, xt, is measured by the
natural logarithm of the ratio of GDP and business gross fixed capital formation
implicit prices. The values assigned to the parameters describing the investment-
specific technological change stochastic process are then obtained from an OLS
estimation of relation (8.5): ρx = .968 and σx = .01.
xˆt = .0001 + .968xt−1
(−.78) (73.96)
R¯2 = .975 σx = .0102
(8.20)
The t-ratios in parentheses help infer that the persistence parameter, ρx, is sig-
nificantly positive and the intercept term of the regression is not different from
zero.
8.7 The Cyclical Properties
To have the model produce summary statistics close to observations, I have set
νs, the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to the percentage
equity holding, to .01 and φ, the capital adjustment cost parameter, to 10. Given
Λy = 1, the values of νr, νπ, and νy that minimize the monetary authority’s
objective function are respectively .9, 1.9, and .224.
Table 8.1 shows the cyclical behavior of the financial accelerator economy for
two cases: (1) only TFP shock hits the economy and (2) all the four shocks
considered occur simultaneously.
All the four shocks help explain 78% of the fluctuations in output, 86% of those
in investment, and 95% of those in hours worked. The volatility in consumption,
productivity, money, and inflation they generated exceed observations. TFP shock
accounts for about half of the fluctuations in output and consumption and all of
those in productivity.
As for the monetary policy shock, it adds an extra 18.6 percentage points (pp)
to output volatility, 50 pp to the volatility of consumption, and 72.3 pp to that
of hours worked. The additional fluctuations in consumption and investment are
mainly due to the preference shocks and investment-specific technological change,
respectively.
Adding the fours shocks has helped reproduced the correlation coefficient of
output with consumption and improved those of output with money and inflation
but deteriorated those with investment, hours worked, and nominal interest rate.
Besides, the model well reproduce the near-zero correlation between hours
worked and productivity. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show the sensitivity of the standard
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Table 8.1: Cyclical Behavior of the Canadian and the Financial Accelerator
Economies, Percentage Deviation from Trend of Key Variables
Canadian Economy
Financial Accelerator Economy
Only Technology Shock All Shocks
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Output (GDP) 1.56 1 .89 .85 1 .73 1.22 1 .40
Consumption 1.14 .84 .85 .64 1 .75 1.40 .83 .29
Investment 4.9 .75 .88 2.15 1 .70 4.22 .47 .70
Hours 1.41 .9 .9 .14 .94 .84 1.34 .78 .12
Productivity .68 .42 .62 .69 1 .73 .93 .82 .43
M1 4.4 .4 .92 .64 .84 .87 8.17 .52 .02
Interest Rate 1.35 .56 .75 .12 -1 .72 .15 -.91 .47
Inflation .28 .11 .12 .13 -.95 .50 .74 .48 -.03
Columns (1) Percentage standard deviations, columns (2) Correlation coefficient
with output, and columns (3) First-order autocorrelation coefficient.
deviation of some variables and that of their correlation with output to the elas-
ticity of the external finance premium with respect to entrepreneurs’ percentage
equity holding. An increase in this parameter raises fluctuations in consumption,
entrepreneurs’ net worth, the relative price of capital, and interest rates but re-
duces fluctuations in output, hours worked, and inflation. It makes consumption,
inflation, and labor less procyclical while the price of capital and the net worth
become more countercyclical.
8.8 The Impulse Responses
This subsection shows how the response of the economy to one-off shocks depends
on νs, the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to the percentage
equity holding.
Figure 8.3 shows that an expansionary monetary policy, i.e. a fall in the
nominal interest rate, on the one hand, raises consumption, hours worked, output,
and inflation. On the other hand, investment, the relative price of capital, and the
net worth of entrepreneurs fall as a result of the decrease in the return on capital.
The magnitude and shape of the responses of these latter variables depend on the
value of νs.
A positive money demand shock immediately lowers interest rate, consump-
tion, hours worked, output, and inflation (Figure 8.4). It has the opposite effect
on investment and the relative price of capital. These immediate impacts become
less important as νs increases.
The preference shock, as it appears in Figure 8.5, immediately raises consump-
tion. Output and hours worked also rise despite the fall in real wage. This shock
has a negative impact on savings, which raises the risk-free interest rate. The
relative price of capital goods falls because of the decline in investment. A higher
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Figure 8.6: Impulse Responses to an Investment-Specific Technological Shock,
Deviation form Steady State, the Financial Accelerator Model
νs limits the decline in investment and in the relative price of capital. For a higher
νs, a smaller decline in savings and consequently in investment cause a higher
increase in the risk-free interest rate, which significantly impacts on the response
of entrepreneurs’ net worth.
The investment-specific technological change lowers the relative price of capital
and raises the demand for investment goods (Figure 8.6). Consumption declines as
interest rate rises. Entrepreneurs’ net worth also rise. These impacts are stronger
as νs increases.
9 Conclusion
This research purports to explain business cycles in Canada and finding out
whether monetary disturbances are instrumental in these fluctuations. I have
used both empirical and theoretical models to investigate these issues. The empir-
ical investigations have consisted in studying the relationship between detrended
nominal and real time series and computing impulse responses from vector autore-
gressive models. The theoretical models comprised both RBC and new-Keynesian
models that I have calibrated to Canadian data and simulated.
The empirical investigations have enabled to conclude that money is not neu-
tral. The money measure M1 and its growth rate have turned out to be correlated
with many real variables. So are other measures of money and short-term nom-
inal interest rates. However, the sign and size of the correlation depend on the
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measure of money used. The monetary base and M1 are positively correlated with
the business cycle whereas M2 is countercyclical. Furthermore, the monetary base
and M1 explain business cycles without causing them whereas a mutual causality
between M2 and business cycles emerged. The empirical investigations also reveal
that a major change in the objective of monetary policy, which is the Bank of
Canada’s commitment at the beginning of 1991 to lower inflation to two percent,
caused a break in the cyclical behavior of real and nominal variables. They have
become less volatile. The three measures of money: the monetary base, M1, and
M2, have all become countercyclical and nominal interest rates have become more
pro-cyclical and persistent. This indicates monetary policy does not just curb
inflation but also influences the real economic activity.
The theoretical models assign a role to money: a good required or used to save
time in shopping, or a good that directly yields utility. They also point various
channels whereby monetary disturbances propagate to the real economy: nominal
capital gain tax, nominal price rigidity and deteriorating financial conditions. I
have addressed three questions while simulating the theoretical models: Do mon-
etary policy help account for the cyclical behavior of the Canadian economy? If
so, could changes in the monetary policy rules help account for the break observed
after 1991? Are the propagation channels: nominal capital gain tax, nominal
price rigidity and deteriorating financial conditions essential features to account
for business cycles?
Simulating the theoretical models reveals that TFP shock accounts for most of
business cycle fluctuations. Monetary policy plays a limited role in RBC models
and a more important role in new-Keynesian models. Sensitivity analyses help
conclude that monetary policy shocks do not propagate in the absence of price
stickiness or the interaction of inflation and the nominal capital gain tax. More-
over, changes in the way the monetary authority responds to output fluctuations,
money growth, and inflation could cause breaks in the cyclical behavior of the
economy.
To further the understanding of business cycle fluctuations in Canada, it is
important to look at other determinants a part from technological change and
monetary disturbances. Other determinants pointed to in the literature are ex-
pectations (Beaudry and Portier, 2004; Auray, Gomme, and Guo, 2013).
References
Accolley, D. (2016): “Accounting for
Business Cycles in Canada: I. The
Role of Supply-Side Factors,” .
Amano, R., S. Ambler, and N. Re-
bei (2007): “The macroeconomic
effects of nonzero trend inflation,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing, 39(7), 1821–1838.
Ambler, S., A. Dib, and N. Rebei
(2004): “Optimal taylor rules in an
estimated model of a small open econ-
omy,” .
84 REFERENCES
Apergis, N., et al. (1996): “The
Cyclical Behavior of Prices: Evidence
from Seven Developing Countries,”
Developing Economies, 34, 204–211.
Arango, C., A. Welte, et al.
(2012): The Bank of Canada’s 2009
Methods-of-payment Survey: Method-
ology and Key Results. Bank of
Canada.
Auray, S., P. Gomme, and S. Guo
(2013): “Nominal rigidities, monetary
policy and Pigou cycles,” The Eco-
nomic Journal, 123(568), 455–473.
Barro, R. J. (1977): “Unanticipated
money growth and unemployment in
the United States,” The American
Economic Review, 67(2), 101–115.
Beaudry, P., and F. Portier (2004):
“An exploration into Pigou’s theory
of cycles,” Journal of monetary Eco-
nomics, 51(6), 1183–1216.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and
S. Gilchrist (1999): “The finan-
cial accelerator in a quantitative busi-
ness cycle framework,” Handbook of
macroeconomics, 1, 1341–1393.
Bernanke, B. S., and F. S. Mishkin
(1997): “Inflation targeting: a new
framework for monetary policy?,”
Discussion Paper 2, Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives.
Bils, M., and P. J. Klenow (2004):
“Some evidence on the importance
of sticky prices,” Journalof Political
Economy, 112(5), 947–985.
Blanchard, O. J. (1990): “Why does
money affect output? A survey,”
Handbook of monetary economics, 2,
779–835.
Blinder, A., E. R. Canetti, D. E.
Lebow, and J. B. Rudd (1998):
Asking about prices: a new ap-
proach to understanding price sticki-
ness. Russell Sage Foundation.
Boswijk, H. P. (1995): “Efficient in-
ference on cointegration parameters
in structural error correction models,”
Journal of Econometrics, 69(1), 133–
158.
Calvo, G. A. (1983): “Staggered
prices in a utility-maximizing frame-
work,” Journal of monetary Eco-
nomics, 12(3), 383–398.
Christensen, I., and A. Dib (2008):
“The financial accelerator in an es-
timated New Keynesian model,” Re-
view of Economic Dynamics, 11(1),
155–178.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum,
and C. L. Evans (2005): “Nominal
rigidities and the dynamic effects of a
shock to monetary policy,” Journal of
political Economy, 113(1), 1–45.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and
M. Gertler (1999): “The sci-
ence of monetary policy: a new
Keynesian perspective,” Journal
of Economic Literature, XXXVII,
1661–1707.
(2000): “Monetary policy rules
and macroeconomic stability: evi-
dence and some theory,” The Quar-
terly journal of economics, 115(1),
147–180.
REFERENCES 85
Cooley, T. F., and G. D. Hansen
(1989): “The inflation tax in a real
business cycle model,” The American
Economic Review, pp. 733–748.
(1991): “The welfare costs
of moderate inflations,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 23(3),
483–503.
(1992): “Tax distortions in
a neoclassical monetary economy,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 58(2),
290–316.
(1995): “Money and the busi-
ness cycle,” Frontiers of business cycle
research, pp. 175–216.
(1998): “The role of monetary
shocks in equilibrium business cycle
theory: Three examples,” European
Economic Review, 42(3), 605–617.
Cooley, T. F., and L. E. Oha-
nian (1991): “The cyclical behavior
of prices,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 28(1), 25–60.
Cooley, T. F., and E. C. Prescott
(1995): “Economic growth and busi-
ness cycles,” Frontiers of business cy-
cle research, 1.
Cross, P., and P. Bergevin (2012):
“Turning points: business cycles in
Canada since 1926,” CD Howe Insti-
tute, 366.
Dib, A. (2006): “Nominal rigidities and
monetary policy in Canada,” Journal
of Macroeconomics, 28(2), 303–325.
Dittmar, R. D., W. T. Gavin, and
F. E. Kydland (2005): “Inflation
persistence and flexible prices,” In-
ternational Economic Review, 46(1),
245–261.
Ericsson, N. R. (1995): “Conditional
and structural error correction mod-
els,” Journal of Econometrics, 69(1),
159–171.
Fisher, J. D. (2006): “The dynamic
effects of neutral and investment-
specific technology shocks,” Journal
of political Economy, 114(3), 413–451.
Flodén, M. (2000): “Endogenous mon-
etary policy and the business cycle,”
European Economic Review, 44(8),
1409–1429.
Friedman, M., and A. J. Schwartz
(1963): A monetary history of the
United States, 1867-1960. Princeton
University Press.
Gali, J. (1999): “Technology, Employ-
ment, and The Business Cycle: Do
Technology Shocks Explain Aggre-
gate Fluctuations?,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(1), 249–271.
Galı, J., and M. Gertler (1999):
“Inflation dynamics: A structural
econometric analysis,” Journal of
monetary Economics, 44(2), 195–222.
Gavin, W. T., and F. E. Kydland
(1999): “Endogenous money supply
and the business cycle,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 2(2), 347–369.
Gavin, W. T., F. E. Kydland, and
M. R. Pakko (2007): “Monetary
policy, taxes, and the business cy-
cle,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
54(6), 1587–1611.
86 REFERENCES
Gomme, P., and P. Rupert (2007):
“Theory, measurement and calibra-
tion of macroeconomic models,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 54(2),
460–497.
Gordon, R. J. (1990): “What is
new-Keynesian economics?,” journal
of Economic Literature, 28(3), 1115–
1171.
Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and
G. W. Huffman (1988): “Invest-
ment, capacity utilization, and the
real business cycle,” The American
Economic Review, pp. 402–417.
Griffoli, T. M. (2007): “Dynare
user guide: An introduction to the
solution and estimation of DSGE
models,” Manuscript, http://www.
cepremap. cnrs. fr/dynare.
Hamilton, J. D. (1994): Time series
analysis, vol. 2. Princeton university
press Princeton.
Hansen, G. D. (1985): “Indivisible la-
bor and the business cycle,” Journal
of monetary Economics, 16(3), 309–
327.
Henry, C. S., K. P. Huynh, Q. R.
Shen, et al. (2015): “2013 Methods-
of-Payment Survey Results,” Bank of
Canada Discussion Paper, (2015-4).
Ireland, P. N. (1997): “A small,
structural, quarterly model for mon-
etary policy evaluation,” in Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Pub-
lic Policy, vol. 47, pp. 83–108. Else-
vier.
(2001): “Sticky-price models of
the business cycle: specification and
stability,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 47(1), 3–18.
(2003): “Endogenous money or
sticky prices?,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50(8), 1623–1648.
Jacobs, J. P., and K. F. Wal-
lis (2010): “Cointegration, long-run
structural modelling and weak ex-
ogeneity: Two models of the UK
economy,” Journal of Econometrics,
158(1), 108–116.
Johansen, S. (1988): “Statistical anal-
ysis of cointegration vectors,” Jour-
nal of economic dynamics and control,
12(2), 231–254.
(1991): “Estimation and hy-
pothesis testing of cointegration vec-
tors in Gaussian vector autoregres-
sive models,” Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, pp. 1551–
1580.
(1995): Likelihood-based infer-
ence in cointegrated vector autoregres-
sive models. Oxford university press.
Klenow, P. J., and O. Kryvtsov
(2008): “State-dependent or time-
dependent pricing: Does it matter for
recent US inflation?,” Discussion Pa-
per 3.
Kydland, F. E., and E. C.
Prescott (1990): “Business cy-
cles: Real facts and a monetary
myth,” Quarterly Review, 383.
REFERENCES 87
Mankiw, N. G. (1989): “Real busi-
ness cycles: A new Keynesian per-
spective,” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 3(3), 79–90.
Pagan, A. R., and M. H. Pe-
saran (2008): “Econometric analy-
sis of structural systems with perma-
nent and transitory shocks,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control,
32(10), 3376–3395.
Palacios, M., and C. Lammam
(2013): “Taxes versus the Necessities
of Life: The Canadian Consumer Tax
Index,” Fraser Alert.
Palacios, M., C. Lammam, and
F. Ren (2015): “Taxes versus the
Necessities of Life: The Canadian
Consumer Tax Index, 2014 edition,”
Fraser Institute. Retrieved October, 5.
Pfaff, B., et al. (2008): “VAR,
SVAR and SVEC models: Implemen-
tation within R package vars,” Jour-
nal of Statistical Software, 27(4), 1–
32.
Rotemberg, J. J. (1982): “Sticky
prices in the United States,” The
Journal of Political Economy, pp.
1187–1211.
Rotemberg, J. J., and M. Wood-
ford (1997): “An optimization-based
econometric framework for the eval-
uation of monetary policy,” NBER
macroeconomics annual, 12, 297–346.
(1999): “Interest rate rules
in an estimated sticky price model,”
in Monetary policy rules, pp. 57–126.
University of Chicago Press.
Serletis, A., and T. E. Molik
(2000): “Monetary aggregates and
monetary policy,” Money, Mone-
tary Policy, and Transmission Mech-
anisms, pp. 103–35.
Sims, C. A. (1980): “Macroeconomics
and reality,” Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, pp. 1–48.
(1992): “Interpreting the
macroeconomic time series facts: The
effects of monetary policy,” European
Economic Review, 36(5), 975–1000.
Taylor, J. B. (1980): “Aggregate
dynamics and staggered contracts,”
Journal of political economy, 88(1), 1–
23.
(1993): “Discretion versus pol-
icy rules in practice,” in Carnegie-
Rochester conference series on public
policy, vol. 39, pp. 195–214. Elsevier.
Walsh, C. E. (2010): Monetary theory
and policy. MIT press.
Yun, T. (1996): “Nominal price rigid-
ity, money supply endogeneity, and
business cycles,” Journal of monetary
Economics, 37(2), 345–370.
88 A THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
Appendices
A The Optimization Problems
A.1 The Inflation Tax Model
V (St) = max a ln c1t + (1− a) ln c2t +Υ(1− lt) + βEtV (St+1)
+ µ1t (mt + τt − ptc1t)
+ µ2t [pt (wtlt + rtkt) +mt + τt − pt (c1t + c2t + it)−mt+1]
+ µ3t [(1− δ)kt + it − kt+1] , (A.1a)
with St = (kt,mt, zt, ξt).
The First-Order Conditions (FOCs)
c1t :
a
c1t
= (µ1t + µ2t) pt (A.2a)
c2t :
1− a
c2t
= µ2tpt (A.2b)
lt : Υ = µ2tptwt (A.2c)
it : µ2tpt = µ3t (A.2d)
kt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂kt+1
= µ3t (A.2e)
mt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂mt+1
= µ2t (A.2f)
The Envelope Conditions
kt :
∂V (St)
∂kt
= µ2tptrt + (1− δ)µ3t (A.3a)
mt :
∂V (St)
∂mt
= µ1t + µ2t (A.3b)
The following relations emerge from the FOCs and the envelope conditions
Υc2t = (1− a)wt (A.4a)
βEt
[
(1 + rt+1 − δ) c2t
c2,t+1
]
= 1 (A.4b)
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βEt
(
c2t
c1,t+1
pt
pt+1
)
=
1− a
a
(A.4c)
Relation (A.4a) results from a combination of (A.2b) and (A.2c). To get (A.4b),
plug the envelope condition (A.3a) into the FOC (A.2e) and then use (A.2d),
which gives
βEt
[
(1 + rt+1 − δ) µ2,t+1
µ2t
pt+1
pt
]
= 1.
Plugging then (A.2b) into the above relation gives (A.4b). To get (A.4c), first, plug
the lead of the envelope condition (A.3b) into the FOC (A.2f). Then use (A.2a)
and (A.2b)
The Normalized Equations
Let vt and vt respectively designate the vectors of non-stationary real and nominal
variables, vt = (c1t, c2t, it, kt, wt, yt) and vt = (mt, τt). Normalizing these vectors
gives v˜ = vt/γ
t
z and vˆ = vt/γ
t
m, with γm = γzπ. Normalizing the price level
gives p¯t = pt/π
t.
p¯tc˜1t = mˆt + τˆt (A.5a)
p¯t
(
c˜1t + c˜2t + i˜t
)
+ γzπmt+1 = p¯t
(
w˜tlt + rtk˜t
)
+ mˆt + τˆt (A.5b)
c˜t = c˜1t + c˜2t (A.5c)
γz k˜t+1 = (1− δ)k˜t + i˜t (A.5d)
Υc˜2t = (1− a)w˜t (A.5e)
βEt
[
(1 + rt+1 − δ) c˜2t
c˜2,t+1
]
= γz (A.5f)
βEt
(
c˜2t
c˜1,t+1
p¯t
p¯t+1
)
= γzπ
1− a
a
(A.5g)
y˜t = k˜
α
t [exp(z˜t)lt]
1−α (A.5h)
z˜t = ρz z˜t−1 + ǫzt (A.5i)
rt = α
y˜t
k˜t
(A.5j)
w˜t = (1− α) y˜t
lt
(A.5k)
mˆt+1 = exp(ξt)mˆt (A.5l)
ξt = ρmξt−1 + ǫmt (A.5m)
τˆt = γzπmˆt+1 − mˆt (A.5n)
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A.2 The RBC Model with Endogenous Money
V (St) = max 1
e
cet (1− lt − st)υe + βEtV (St+1)
+ µ1t
[
ω0 − ω1
(
mt
ptct
)ω2
− st
]
+ µ2t [pt (wtlt + rtkt) +mt + τt − pt (ct + it)−mt+1]
+ µ3t [(1− δ)kt + it − kt+1] , (A.6a)
with St = (kt,mt, zt, ξt).
The FOCs
ct : c
e−1
t (1− lt − st)υe + µ1t
ω1ω2
ct
(
mt
ptct
)ω2
= µ2tpt (A.7a)
lt : υc
e
t (1− lt − st)υe−1 = µ2tptwt (A.7b)
st : −υcet (1− lt − st)υe−1 = µ1t (A.7c)
it : µ2tpt = µ3t (A.7d)
kt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂kt+1
= µ3t (A.7e)
mt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂mt+1
= µ2t (A.7f)
The Envelope Conditions
kt :
∂V (St)
∂kt
= µ2tptrt + (1− δ)µ3t (A.8a)
mt :
∂V (St)
∂mt
= −µ1tω1ω2
ptct
(
mt
ptct
)ω2−1
+ µ2t (A.8b)
The following relations emerge from the FOCs and the envelope conditions
1− lt − ω0 + (1− υω2)ω1
(
mt
ptct
)ω2
= υ
ct
wt
(A.9a)
βEt
[
(1 + rt+1 − δ)
(
ct+1
ct
)e(1− lt+1 − st+1
1− lt − st
)υe−1 wt
wt+1
]
= 1 (A.9b)
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βEt
[
pt
pt+1
wt
wt+1
+ ω1ω2
ptwt
mt+1
(
mt+1
pt+1ct+1
)ω2]
×
(
ct+1
ct
)e(1− lt+1 − st+1
1− lt − st
)υe−1
= 1 (A.9c)
A.3 The Inflation and Tax Code Model
V (St) = max 1
e
Cet (1− Lt − St)υe + βEtV (St+1)
subject to:
St = ω0 − ω1
(
Mt
PtCt
)ω2
(A.10a)
Pt(Ct + It) +Bt+1 +Mt+1 + τgtGt =Mt + Tt + (1− τlt)PtwtLt
+ [(1− τkt)qt + τktδ]PtKt
+ [1 + (1− τbt)(Rt − 1)]Bt (A.10b)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (A.10c)
Gt = (Pt − Pt−1)Kt (A.10d)
with St = (Kt,Mt, zt).
The FOCs
Ct : C
e−1
t (1− Lt − St)υe + µ1t
ω1ω2
Ct
(
Mt
PtCt
)ω2
= µ2tPt (A.11a)
Lt : υC
e
t (1− Lt − St)υe−1 = µ2t(1− τlt)Ptwt (A.11b)
St : −υCet (1− Lt − St)υe−1 = µ1t (A.11c)
It : µ2tPt = µ3t (A.11d)
Gt : −µ2tτgt = µ4t (A.11e)
Kt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Kt+1
= µ3t (A.11f)
Mt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Mt+1
= µ2t (A.11g)
Bt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Bt+1
= µ2t (A.11h)
The Lagrange multipliers µ1t through µ4t are respectively associated to the con-
straints (A.10a) through (A.10d).
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The Envelope Conditions
Kt :
∂V (St)
∂Kt
= µ2t [(1− τkt)qt + τktδ]Pt + (1− δ)µ3t
+ µ4t (Pt − Pt−1) (A.12a)
Mt :
∂V (St)
∂Mt
= −µ1tω1ω2
PtCt
(
Mt
PtCt
)ω2−1
+ µ2t (A.12b)
Bt :
∂V (St)
∂Bt
= µ2t [1 + (1− τbt)(Rt − 1)] (A.12c)
Combining the FOCs and the envelope conditions gives
1− Lt − ω0 + (1− υω2)ω1
(
Mt
PtCt
)ω2
= υ
Ct
(1− τlt)wt (A.13a)(
Mt
Pt
)ω2−1
=
1− τbt
1− τlt
Rt − 1
wt
Cω2t
ω1ω2
(A.13b)
βEt
[
1 + (1− τk,t+1) (qt+1 − δ)− τg,t+1
(
1− Pt
Pt+1
)]
×
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e(1− lt+1 − st+1
1− lt − st
)υe−1 1− τlt
1− τl,t+1
wt
wt+1
= 1. (A.13c)
Et
{[
1 + (1− τk,t+1) (qt+1 − δ)− τg,t+1
(
1− Pt
Pt+1
)]
Pt+1
Pt
}
= 1
+Et(1− τb,t+1)(Rt+1 − 1) (A.13d)
A.4 The Sticky Price Model
V (St) = max at
[
Cet
e
+
χ1−ηt
η
(
Mt
Pt
)η]
+ υ ln(1− Lt) + βEtV (St+1)
subject to:
wtLt + qtKt +
Mt−1
Pt
+
Bt−1
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
− Tt
Pt
= Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + φ
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)2
Kt
+
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
PtRt
(A.14a)
with St = (Kt,Mt−1, Bt−1, zt).
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The FOCs
Ct : atC
e−1
t = µt (A.15a)
Lt :
υ
1− Lt = µtwt (A.15b)
Kt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Kt+1
= µt
[
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)]
(A.15c)
Mt :
atχ
1−η
t
Pt
(
Mt
Pt
)η−1
+ β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Mt
=
µt
Pt
(A.15d)
Bt : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Bt
=
µt
PtRt
(A.15e)
The Envelope Conditions
Kt :
∂V (St)
∂Kt
= µt
[
1 + qt − δ + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)(
Kt+1
Kt
+
κ
2
)]
(A.16a)
Mt−1 :
∂V (St)
∂Mt−1
=
µt
Pt
(A.16b)
Bt−1 :
∂V (St)
∂Bt−1
=
µt
Pt
(A.16c)
Combining the FOCs and the envelope conditions gives
υ
at
C1−et = wt(1− Lt) (A.17a)
χ1−ηt
(
Mt
Pt
)η−1
=
Rt − 1
Rt
Ce−1t (A.17b)
βEt
[
at+1
at
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e−1 Pt
Pt+1
]
Rt = 1 (A.17c)
βEt
{
at+1
at
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e−1 [
1 + qt+1 − δ + φ
(
Kt+2
Kt+1
− κ
)(
Kt+2
Kt+1
+
κ
2
)]}
=
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− κ
)
(A.17d)
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A.5 The Financial Accelerator Model
V (St) = max at
e
ln
[
Cet + χ
1−e
t
(
Mt
Pt
)e]
+ υ ln(1− Lt) + βEtV (St+1)
+µtPt
(
wtLt +RtBt +
Dt+1 +Mt−1 −Mt − Tt
Pt
− Ct +Bt+1
)
(A.18a)
with St = (Bt,Mt−1, zt).
The FOCs
Ct : at
Ce−1t
Cet + χ
1−e
t
(
Mt
Pt
)e = µtPt (A.19a)
Lt :
υ
1− Lt = µtPtwt (A.19b)
Bt+1 : β
∂EtV (St+1)
∂Bt+1
= µtPt (A.19c)
Mt :
atχ
1−e
t
Pt
(
Mt
Pt
)e−1
Cet + χ
1−e
t
(
Mt
Pt
)e + β∂EtV (St+1)∂Mt = µt (A.19d)
The Envelope Conditions
Bt :
∂V (St)
∂Bt
= µtPtRt (A.20a)
Mt−1 :
∂V (St)
∂Mt−1
= µt (A.20b)
Combining the FOCs and the envelope conditions gives
υ
at
C1−et
[
Cet + χ
1−e
t
(
Mt
Pt
)e]
= wt(1− Lt) (A.21a)
χ1−et
(
Mt
Pt
)e−1
=
Rt+1 − 1
Rt+1
Ce−1t (A.21b)
βEt

at+1
at
(
Ct+1
Ct
)e−1 Cet + χ1−et (MtPt
)e
Cet+1 + χ
1−e
t+1
(
Mt+1
Pt+1
)eRt+1

 = 1 (A.21c)
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A.6 The Optimal Contracting Problem
max E
{∫ ∞
ν¯t
νdF (ν)− [1− F (ν¯t)] ν¯t
}
Rk,t+1PktKt+1
subject to: {
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯
0
νdF (ν)
}
Rk,t+1Pk,tKt+1
= Rt+1 (PktKt+1 −Nt+1) (A.22)
The FOCs
Letting µt denote the Lagrange multiplier, one has
ν¯t : µt {1− F (ν¯t)−Aν¯tf(ν¯t)} = 1− F (ν¯t)
(A.23a)
Kt+1 : E
{∫ ∞
ν¯t
νdF (ν)− [1− F (ν¯t)] ν¯t
}
Rk,t+1 = µtRt+1
−µt
{
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯t
0
νdF (ν¯)
}
Rk,t+1 (A.23b)
µt :
{
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯
0
νdF (ν)
}
Rk,t+1PktKt+1 = Rt+1×
(PktKt+1 −Nt+1) . (A.23c)
From j(A.23b), one has
µt
Rt+1
Rk,t+1
= E
{∫ ∞
ν¯t
νdF (ν)− [1− F (ν¯t)] ν¯t
}
+ µt
{
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯t
0
νdF (ν¯)
}
,
and from (A.23c), one has
Rt+1
Rk,t+1
=
{
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯
0
νdF (ν)
}
PktKt+1
Pk,tKt+1 −Nt+1 .
Then plugging the latter relation into the former gives
PktKt+1
Nt+1
= 1 + µt
[1− F (ν¯t)]ν¯t + (1−A)
∫ ν¯
0 νdF (ν)
E
{∫∞
ν¯t
νdF (ν)− [1− F (ν¯t)] ν¯t
}
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= Ψ(ν¯t), (A.24)
with Ψ′(ν¯t) > 0. The function Ψ is therefore invertible, i.e. one could write
v¯t = Ψ
−1(PktKt+1/Nt+1).
From (A.23b), one can express Rk,t+1/Rt+1, the premium on external funds,
as a function of the cutoff value ν¯t, i.e. Rk,t+1/Rt+1 = ρ(ν¯t). Given ρ
′(ν¯t) > 0
for ν¯t > 0 (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999, p 1383), one can write
ν¯t = ρ
−1(Rk,t+1/Rt+1). Plugging this into (A.24) gives
PktKt+1
Nt+1
= Ψ
(
ρ−1
(
Rk,t+1
Rt+1
))
= ψ
(
Rk,t+1
Rt+1
)
,
or
Nt+1
PktKt+1
=
[
ψ
(
Rk,t+1
Rt+1
)]−1
,
which one could inverse to get
Rk,t+1
Rt+1
= s
(
Nt+1
PktKt+1
)
. (A.25)
B The New-Keynesian Inflation Adjustment Equations
Twp cases are considered in turn: first, trend inflation is non-zero and second, no
trend inflation.
B.1 Adjustment Equations with Trend Inflation
Let Xt be a variable following a first-order linear difference equation with a time-
varying coefficient
Xt = AEtBt+1Xt+1 + Ft, (B.1)
where Et is the expectation operator, Ft is the forcing variable, and A and Bt+1
are the coefficients. Iterating forward (B.1) gives the following general solution
Xt =
∞∑
j=0
AjEt
(
j∏
i=0
Bt+i
)
Ft+j + lim
j→∞
AjEt
(
j∏
i=0
Bt+i
)
Ft+j .
For 0 < A < 1, the last element in the rhs of the above solution vanishes and one
gets
Xt =
∞∑
j=0
AjEt
(
j∏
i=0
Bt+i
)
Ft+j . (B.2)
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This result will be used to expressed recursively both the numerator and de-
nominator of (7.10), the price adjustment equation. As explained earlier, at equi-
librium, all adjusting firms choose the same price, P ∗t (i) = P
∗
t . Besides, under
Calvo pricing, ̟j = ̟
j for 0 ≤ j <∞. Relation (7.10) thus becomes
p∗t =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0(̟β)
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ
Yt+jϕt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ−1
Yt+j
where p∗t = P
∗
t /Pt. By multiplying both sides of the above relation by p
∗
t
−1, one
normalizes its lhs element to unity, which gives after rearrangement,
1 =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0(̟β)
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ
p∗t
−1−θYt+jϕt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0̟jβ
j µt+j
µt
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ−1
p∗t
−θYt+j
.
A way to express the numerator and denominator of the above relation recursively
as in (B.2) is to decompose the ratios into products of consecutive terms
1 =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0(̟β)
j
[∏j
i=0
µt+i+1
µt+i
πθt+i+1
(
p∗t+i
p∗t+i+1
)−1−θ]
p∗ −1−θt+j+1 Yt+jϕt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0(̟β)
j
[∏j
i=0
µt+i+1
µt+i
πθ−1t+i+1
(
p∗
t+i
p∗t+i+1
)−θ]
p∗ −θt+j+1Yt+j
,
(B.3)
where πt+j+1 = Pt+j+1/Pt+j . Calling respectively X1t and X2t the numerator and
the denominator of the second fraction on the rhs of (B.3), the New-Keynesian
adjustment equations turns out to be
1 =
θ
θ − 1
X1t
X2t
(B.4a)
X1t = ̟βEtπ
θ
t+1
µt+1
µt
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−1−θ
X1,t+1 + p
∗ −1−θ
t Ytϕt (B.4b)
X2t = ̟βEtπ
θ−1
t+1
µt+1
µt
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−θ
X2,t+1 + p
∗ −θ
t Yt. (B.4c)
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Let’s consider relation (7.14), which is divided by P 1−θt to get
1 = ̟πθ−1t + (1−̟)p∗t 1−θ,
with πt = Pt/Pt+1 and p
∗
t = P
∗
t /Pt. A first-order Taylor series approximation of
this relation is
pˆ∗t =
̟
1−̟πˆt, (B.5)
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where the hat over the variables p∗t and πt denotes their percentage deviations
from steady.
Let’s now consider relation (7.10) at equilibrium, which can be rewritten as
follows
p∗tEt
∞∑
j=0
(̟β)jµt+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ−1
Yt+j =
θ
θ − 1Et
∞∑
j=0
(̟β)jµt+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)θ
Yt+jϕt+j .
A first-order Taylor series approximation of this relation gives
µY
1−̟β +
µY
1−̟β pˆ
∗
t + µY Et
∞∑
j=0
(̟β)j
[
µˆt+j + Yˆt+j + (θ − 1) (pˆt+j − pˆt)
]
=
µY
1−̟β
θ
θ − 1ϕ+
θ
θ − 1ϕµY Et
∞∑
j=0
(̟β)j
[
µˆt+j + Yˆt+j + θ (pˆt+j − pˆt) + ϕˆt+j
]
When prices are flexible, i.e. for ̟ = 0, p∗t = ϕtθ/(θ − 1), which implies that,
at steady state, ϕθ/(θ − 1) = 1. Plugging this into the rhs of the above relation
and then canceling the elements appearing on both sides gives
1
1−̟β pˆ
∗
t = Et
∞∑
j=0
(̟β)j (pˆt+j − pˆt + ϕˆt+j) ,
which one rearranges to get
pˆ∗t + pˆt = (1−̟β)Et
∞∑
j=0
(̟β)j (pˆt+j + ϕˆt+j) .
As shown in Appendix B.1, this equation is the solution of a first-order difference
equation of the form
pˆ∗t + pˆt = (1−̟β) (pˆt + ϕˆt) +̟βEt
(
pˆ∗t+1 + pˆt+1
)
.
Rearranging this gives
pˆ∗t = (1−̟β)ϕˆt +̟βEt
(
pˆ∗t+1 + pˆt+1 − pˆt
)
= (1−̟β)ϕˆt +̟βEt
(
pˆ∗t+1 + πˆt+1
)
.
Plugging (B.5) into the above relation gives,
̟
1−̟πˆt = (1−̟β)ϕˆt +
̟β
1−̟Etπˆt+1.
Finally, after rearrangement, one gets the new-Keynesian Phillips curve
πˆt =
(1−̟)(1−̟β)
̟
ϕˆt + βEtπˆt+1. (B.6)
